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ABSTRACT 
The Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) 
is a coordinated Department of Defense Program established at the request of the 
Combatant Commands (COCOMs) to support the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).  
CENTRIXS is a standing, global enterprise network allowing U.S. and coalition nations 
and their forces, in a seamless manner, to securely share operational and intelligence 
information in support of combined planning, unity of effort, and decision making in 
multinational operations. 
This thesis describes CENTRIXS networks that support the needs of the 
COCOMs on a global basis.  The document also addresses who is connected to whom, 
what kinds of information must be passed from one user to another, and the services 
provided to the users of CENTRIXS networks.  We conduct a Knowledge Value Added 
analysis to streamline the manning and usability of CENTRIXS nodes.  We also explore 
how to efficiently and effectively go through the process of acquisition, installation, and 
accreditation of a CENTRIXS node. 
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CENTRIXS is a standing, global enterprise network allowing U.S. and coalition 
nations and their forces to securely share operational and intelligence information in 
support of combined planning, unity of effort, and decision making in multinational 
operations.  When we first proposed our idea for a thesis, the general area of thesis 
research was to focus on the installation and full deployment of a CENTRIXS network at 
the Naval Postgraduate School.  The development of this network would consist of 
funding acquisition, hardware and software acquisition, architecting the LAN/WAN 
network, cryptographic implementation, and information assurance documentation.  The 
focus was on the network-centric use of a secure information medium with government 
off-the-shelf and commercial off-the-shelf technologies to facilitate effective information 
sharing and interoperability between the Naval Postgraduate School and all nodes of joint 
and coalition forces. 
Initially, we put together a survey designed to assess the need and desire by the 
NPS faculty and staff for a CENTRIXS node install on campus.  The survey provided 
questions geared toward gathering information in order to enhance the learning 
environment and training benefits associated with a CENTRIXS node installation.  There 
is a constant flow of students representing scores of countries that could receive 
important training by having a CENTRIXS node on campus where they could receive an 
introduction to the system and become somewhat proficient before returning to their 
respective commands.  Our research team was not prepared for the difficulty encountered  
in getting the survey to our target group.  There are many policy restrictions in place at 
NPS regarding mass-emailing anything to members of the faculty and staff.  Although we 
had a difficult time administering the survey because of these NPS policy restrictions, 




distribution and response were less than hoped, we include the survey and related 
material in Appendix H, and anticipate it will produce a rich data source for future 
research. 
Annually, there are thousands of U.S. officers, combined with scores of 
international coalition officers who would greatly benefit from the training associated 
with a CENTRIXS point of presence here at NPS.  However, in order to set the 
foundation for a CENTRIXS node installation on campus, we found that we needed to 
narrow our scope.  This research turned out to be our finished product. 
B. OVERVIEW 
Through research and study, we attempt to encapsulate thousands of pages of 
documentation on CENTRIXS, and combine them into a single document that is concise 
and user friendly.  The following paragraphs discuss how we organized this thesis. 
We start by defining what CENTRIXS is by illustrating the strategic concept.  We 
discuss the operational, mission, and personnel requirements to help build a picture in the 
mind’s eye of the reader.  An architectural description is provided, which contains the 
system scope, support environment, personnel assessment, and how the end users utilize 
the system.  We conduct an architecture evaluation in order to show ways to improve the 
modifiability, security, and usability of CENTRIXS networks. 
In this research, we also conducted a Knowledge Value Added analysis to 
streamline the manning and usability of CENTRIXS nodes.  We analyzed the current 
architecture, personnel, and training requirements, then consolidated suggestions on how 
to improve the system as a whole.  Finally, we explore how to efficiently and effectively 
go through the process of acquisition, installation, and accreditation of a CENTRIXS 
node and some of the challenges associated with such a task. 
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II. DEFINING CENTRIXS/ARCHITECTURE EVALUATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the methodology of operating the CENTRIXS networks to 
support the needs of Combatant Commands (COCOMs) on a global basis.  This chapter 
addresses in general terms who is connected to whom, what kinds of information must be 
exchanged between users, and the services provided to the users of CENTRIXS 
networks.  “Combined Operations” are defined as those conducted by the forces of two or 
more nations acting together for the accomplishment of an agreed, common mission.  
This chapter also provides an operational overview of the use of CENTRIXS and 
covers its mission, policies and constraints regarding the use of CENTRIXS, the 
environment in which it operates, and the groups of people and organizations that are its 
users.  In addition, it also covers the operational needs of the COCOMs dictated by the 
coalition mission. Finally, it describes the capabilities of CENTRIXS, operational and 
support environments, and provides illustrations of the employment of CENTRIXS 
through operational scenarios. 
This chapter also explains, in non-technical terms, the COCOM needs for 
coalition information sharing based on the assumption that most, if not all, future 
operations involving U.S. forces will require the secure sharing of information with 
foreign nations and their respective forces. Coalition information sharing between nations 
and their forces in these combined operations is critical to their success. 
We will also describe the theory behind CENTRIXS architecture and evaluate 
how it works in practice with the use of the Architecture Tradeoff Analysis Method 
(ATAM). The ATAM will reveal how well the architecture satisfies particular quality 
goals (such as performance or modifiability), but it also provides insight into how those 
quality goals interact with each other (Clements, 35, 2002). 
Joint warfighting operations demand responsive information exchange across 
COCOMs and combined forces for planning, unity of effort, decision superiority, and 
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decisive global operations. The overarching warfare requirements supported are: coalition 
C2; a Common Operational Picture (COP); intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
(ISR); and coalition information sharing. CENTRIXS is the U.S. global, secure, 
information network solution to support coalition operations with shared, combined 
command, control and intelligence information. 
B. PROBLEM CHARACTERIZATION 
The CENTRIXS is a coordinated Department of Defense Program established at 
the request of the Combatant Commands (COCOMs) to support the Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT).  CENTRIXS is a common set of networks built on a set of standard 
hardware, software, and services. Due to today’s policy, operational, and technical 
limitations, each of these CENTRIXS networks operates at a single security classification 
level. These networks operate globally, regionally, and locally; in addition, some of them 
have many members, some have fewer, and some are bilateral in nature. The consistent 
thread is that they are built to the CENTRIXS standard so that they are essentially “plug 
and play” anywhere in the world (Boardman, 2, 2004.) 
Today, CENTRIXS uses certified and accredited guarding technology to connect 
some of these networks together and with U.S. networks, but these connections are very 
restricted and, by their nature, difficult to manage.  CENTRIXS consists of a collection of 
coalition wide area networks (WAN) known as “enclaves” which include CENTRIXS 
Four Eyes (CFE), for the United States, Australia, Canada and Great Britain; 
CENTRIXS-J for the United States and Japan; and CENTRIXS-K for the United States 
and Korea (U.S. Navy homepage, 2007.)  In most cases, users must have a separate 
workstation for each network enclave.  The establishment of additional CENTRIXS 
networks is determined by the demands of the particular exercise or world situation.  
CENTRIXS is exploring advanced techniques and technology to allow users access to 
several networks of different classifications from a single workstation. 
CENTRIXS networks are globally interoperable and interconnected, relatively 
inexpensive, and easy to use, built with existing, readily available, commercial 
technology. Interoperable and interconnected means that all required users for any 
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particular CENTRIXS network can exchange the appropriate information with each 
other.  Inexpensive means that limited resources are required to build the CENTRIXS 
networks.  “Easy to use” means that generally anyone who is familiar with simple office 
suite software and the use of a browser and an e-mail client can easily learn to use any 
CENTRIXS network. 
C. STRATEGIC CONCEPT 
The CENTRIXS is designed to meet the immediate operational needs of the 
Combatant Commands, allowing them to share information with coalition partners 
(nations and their forces) in the Global War on Terrorism and other rapidly developing 
military contingencies.  Global CENTRIXS refers to the inter-linking of the various 
CENTRIXS Enterprise networks (enclaves) at the COCOMs, by the global CENTRIXS 
Network Control Center (CNCC) (Boardman, 2, 2004.) 
Once a mission is assigned to or assumed by a COCOM that requires a coalition 
information-sharing network, the Command will consider the use of those existing 
CENTRIXS networks to which it already has access. If possible, an extension of existing 
networks will suffice; in others, it may be possible to use techniques (like virtual private 
networks (VPN)) to establish a separate channel over a particular network consisting of a 
sub-set of that network’s authorized users; and as a last resort, the Command can 
consider initiating a separately encrypted CENTRIXS network at a new security 
classification.1 
If applicable, the CENTRIXS network chosen would be used to link the planning 
of the COCOM with the planning elements of its components as well as the coalition 
forces that will participate.  In addition, there may be a need to connect the Ministries of 
Defense of these nations, their forces, and sources of intelligence (either U.S. or 
coalition) to support the planning.  Planning activity conducted over the CENTRIXS 
                                                 
1 This calculation should be made by the Commander based on a risk/benefit ratio. New, separately 
encrypted networks are costly not only in dollars, but also in response time and manpower. If an existing 
network can be used, the Command can expect a more rapid network buildup, less cost to be incurred, and 
require fewer personnel to maintain them. This should also be a result of the commander’s consideration of 
the risk to the operation and information; a risk management decision which properly resides at the highest 
level within the Command. 
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network should include (but not be limited to) force contribution coordination; mission, 
strategy, and campaign planning; basing and transportation; logistics; intelligence 
sharing; rules of engagement; as well as the initial operational planning necessary for 
force entry and engagement (Boardman, 3, 2004.) 
The goals of the before mentioned applicable CENTRIXS concepts are as 
follows: 
• Enable Coalition Information Sharing: The primary objective of 
CENTRIXS is to enable secure, coalition information sharing between 
U.S. forces and those of nations cooperating in military operations. This 
involves every aspect of information sharing to include relevant operations 
and intelligence information and data, various security levels, discrete 
separation of various operational communities within the same virtual 
network, and all the various mechanisms for exchanging information 
(email, voice, web “push” and “pull” techniques, chat, et al.). These 
mechanisms cannot be “one way” only (i.e., from U.S. to foreign nation), 
but must accommodate bi-directional capabilities. Considering the nature 
of these exchanges, secure interfaces must be available to the participants 
in order to encourage their willingness to share. 
• Coalition Interoperability: Interoperability of U.S. systems with those of 
coalition partner nations is a key objective of CENTRIXS. CENTRIXS is 
designed to be the U.S. standard for secure, network connectivity to 
achieve interoperability in any coalition situation, whether it is an alliance, 
a coalition, a bilateral or multilateral operation. Open systems 
specifications for hardware and software are desired in order to facilitate 
the ability to interoperate. Hardware and software should be COTS 
products rather than special purpose-built products that serve only one 
specific user. At the application and systems level, proprietary solutions 
should be avoided and international standards (e.g., the ISO); W3C should 
be used whenever possible. 
• Seamless, Flexible Connectivity Worldwide: Seamless, flexible 
connectivity worldwide is required so that U.S. and multinational forces 
from any part of the World have the ability to interoperate regardless of 
location. “Seamless” refers to the ability of one CENTRIXS user to 
exchange with another user with little concern for the physical or virtual 
path of the network. “Flexible” refers to the ability to quickly reconfigure 
CENTRIXS to meet the rapidly evolving and emerging needs of 
combatant commands and their coalition partners. “Worldwide” refers to 
the ability of CENTRIXS-equipped forces to “plug and play” in any 
region of the World. 
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• Availability When Needed: Connectivity to the CENTRIXS infrastructure 
must be immediately available when a U.S. force needs a secure network 
to exchange information with a coalition partner.  The rapidly evolving 
international environment presents situations that are generally 
unpredictable not only in space and time, but also in the participants. In 
order to meet this objective, CENTRIXS must be accessible through all of 
the COCOMs and be extendable to the appropriate objective areas and 
participant nations in a timely manner. 
• Protect Information For CENTRIXS Users:  Finally, protection of the 
information that is exchanged over CENTRIXS must be protected from 
unauthorized access to enable and encourage the exchange itself.  In 
addition, CENTRIXS must provide for the further ability to provide 
discrete separation of information exchanges within the same virtual 
networks.  This includes the ability to protect information exchanged one-
to-one; one-to-many; many-to-many; and between specific groups and/or 
nations; while still preserving the ability to share with a larger group on a 
general level. 
CENTRIXS is differentiated from the overall Multinational Information Sharing 
(MNIS) Program of the Department of Defense (DoD) in that CENTRIXS responds to 
the immediate operational needs of the COCOMs today and is designated a legacy 
system. MNIS (as proposed) deals with the development of future multinational 
information sharing systems and capabilities.  When MNIS capabilities are successfully 
fielded within the Global Information Grid (GIG) Enterprise Information Environment 
(EIE), it is expected that CENTRIXS will be subsumed in some manner by MNIS.  Until 
that time, DoD components will use CENTRIXS for their coalition information sharing 
needs (unless an exception is granted) in accordance with the instructions and directives 
of the DoD (Boardman, 8, 2004.) 
CENTRIXS is co-sponsored by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks 
and Information Integration (ASD (NII))/DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO) and the 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (DUSD(I)).  The CENTRIXS 
Program Management Office (CPMO) functions as an activity under the ASD (NII) and 
the USD (I) to manage CENTRIXS until such time as future Multinational Information 
Sharing (MNIS) systems are fielded and can replace CENTRIXS (DoD Directive 5137.1, 
5, 1992.) 
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COCOMs use CENTRIXS to connect partner nations in a prescribed Area of 
Responsibility (AOR) to improve coalition information sharing capability with those 
nations.  The relatively low cost and simplicity of the system is attractive to coalition 
nations, thereby increasing participation from both the COCOM and allied nation 
partners.  It is important to understand that CENTRIXS is a C2 network made up of many 
parts, which include fixed and deployable workstations. 
CENTRIXS provides the means to share classified information with coalition 
nations and their military forces.  With few physical limits on where the network can be 
extended, CENTRIXS supports not only the forces directly involved in the combined 
operations, but also allows for all of the supporting commands and agencies at every 
operational level to be connected as well.  A fully developed CENTRIXS network can 
connect authorized users around the world in support of combined operations (See 
Appendix A.) 
CENTRIXS uses the U.S. SIPRNET backbone and generally does not require its 
own communications infrastructure.  However, in some cases additional commercial or 
coalition nation circuits can be used to extend the network to required locations.  To 
protect the SIPRNET from malicious attacks, procedures, computer hardware and 
software, and guards are in place to prevent attacks that may originate from CENTRIXS. 
CENTRIXS can be used for global coalition networks or for smaller coalitions or 
even bilateral connections.  When used for a bilateral network, the connections for 
CENTRIXS usually run through the office of the Defense Attaché of a U.S. Embassy. In 
other cases, it may run directly to the Ministries of Defense of partner nations. 
CENTRIXS networks can use a series of guard devices that allow information to 
flow to and from U.S. secure networks without fear of compromising the U.S.-only 
network.  Hardware and software guards, where required, in addition to foreign 
disclosure procedures and information sharing agreements, ensure the security and 
integrity of the systems and information (NDP-1, 22, 2002.)  Table 1 on the next page 
provides a list of various enclaves, their locations, and descriptions. 
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Table 1.   Enclave Descriptions 
Enclave Information Exchange 
CENTRIXS Four Eyes (CFE) Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, United States 
CENTRIXS – J United States and Japan 
CENTRIXS – K United States and Korea 
CENTRIXS Global Counter 
Terrorism Force (GCTF)  
73+ Nations 
CENTRIXS GCTF-COI Countries that have Communities of Interest (COIs) within 
the broader GCTF (i.e., Combined Naval Forces 
CENTCOM, Coalition Force Pacific) 
CENTRIXS Multinational 
Coalition Forces Iraq (MCFI) 
~52+ Nations 
NATO-Mission Secret (MS) NATO 
United States SIPRNET U.S. only 
Established as required Concurrently Operating COIs 
 
D. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
COCOMs have an operational need for coalition information-sharing 
environments where information is shared at the appropriate security levels with partner 
nations and their forces. This environment supports the processing, storing, and 
transmission of releasable information from pre-hostilities through post-combat 
operational planning and execution. Only participants of the coalition operation are 
allowed access within the coalition information-sharing environment, which also has the 
ability to share information with other systems as required. 
As situations warrant, COCOMs will assemble dynamically changing coalitions 
in response to assigned mission requirements.  C2 networks to support these coalitions 
will need to be flexible and dynamic in order to respond to the commander’s mission 
needs.  This means that the networks should be easily established, changed, and 
eventually disestablished as requirements change. 
In general terms, national policy dictates what information can be shared with 
coalition partner nations and their forces for specific operations.  Under normal 
circumstances, coalition information sharing will include all information that 
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commanders need to plan and execute operations and to protect the forces in the AOR.  It 
should be noted that the COCOM Commander has broad authorities for the emergency 
release of information that affect U.S. and foreign forces within his AOR in accordance 
with assigned missions (NDP-1, 24, 1992.) 
U.S. forces are accustomed to using U.S.-only networks for C2, intelligence, and 
logistics in planning, training, preparing for, and executing military operations. When 
faced with the requirement to interoperate with coalition forces, COCOMs often resort to 
ad-hoc methods to exchange information with foreign partner forces.  However, when the 
scope of the operation and the participation of foreign nations’ forces increase in 
importance, combined commanders require solutions that allow them to seamlessly 
interoperate with coalition partners.  When the above requirements take precedence, the 
combined commander often makes the decision to conduct his operations on a coalition 
network, rather than on a U.S. network.  This approach supports coalition 
interoperability, mission accomplishment, and protection of the coalition forces engaged 
(DoD Directive 5137.1, 2, 1992.) 
As a result of the need to use a coalition network, commanders often find 
themselves unable to share some of the information to which they and their forces are 
normally accustomed to accessing via a U.S.-only network.  In many instances, 
provisions have been made for the transfer of critical information using guarding 
technology for finished information products, some databases, real time data, limited 
email, and situational awareness displays in many instances. In many cases, there is still 
the requirement to have material reviewed by a Foreign Disclosure Officer (FDO) or his 
representative prior to release of the information to the coalition networks either in an 
automated manner, or using conventional “sneaker-net” techniques (NDP-1, 61, 2002.) 
In some instances, commanders use more than one coalition network due to the 
limits imposed by policy and technology.  Today, each CENTRIXS network operates at 
an assigned security classification level based on the information exchange requirements 
and the coalition membership. Although the means to pass information from one network 
to another exists, it is limited in nature and manpower intensive. An example of this need 
is when a coalition of nations supports the overall mission, and another set of nations, 
 11
operating in the same area has agreements to share additional information not available to 
the larger group.  Technology will offer only a partial automated solution to this problem. 
CENTRIXS is installed on surface ships (afloat variants) and at the Navy’s 
Regional Network Operations Centers (NOCs) (shore variants).  Working together, the 
afloat and shore variants provide the core data services (i.e., web replication, secure e-
mail, collaboration, COP, chat) and access to allied/coalition networks via established 
firewalls and Cross Domain Solutions (CDS) (See Appendix B.) 
Shore variants will reside at the U.S NOC and at the respective Coalition Network 
Operations Center.  The shore variant serves as the gateway between specific 
CENTRIXS enclave users afloat and allied/coalition networks (See Appendix C.) 
Afloat variants must connect to the shore variant located at a NOC.  Underway, 
surface ships will use the ADNS to coordinate Wide Area Network (WAN) transport 
over various SATCOM links.  The Integrated Shipboard Network System (ISNS) 
provides the ship’s internal Classified (Secret High) local area network (LAN.)  
CENTRIXS afloat variants consist of multiple security enclaves with multiple coalition 
Virtual LANs (VLANs) that reside on the Classified LAN (See Appendix D.) 
Coalition warfare brings its own set of unique operational constraints for the 
COCOM.  These include, but are not limited to (DoD INST 8110.1, 7, 2004): 
• Capabilities: The informational, operational, and technical capabilities 
each nation brings to a coalition will be different. Participating nations 
must understand the constraints on information sharing and agree to a C2 
Interoperability Board (CCIB) process, established by the Regional 
COCOM, to govern coalition information sharing networks in order to 
make the CENTRIXS concept of operations viable. The CCIB process 
will validate command needs and address issues that cannot be resolved at 
lower levels. 
• Security (Releasability/Dissemination): In a coalition environment, the 
protection of classified information is paramount. Each coalition partner is 
responsible for establishing and maintaining a secure interface between 
their national systems and the CENTRIXS networks. In addition, each 
nation is responsible for protecting the shared information and the 




persons or organizations. CENTRIXS networks that are within U.S. 
control will be certified and accredited using the approved processes for 
the information assurance of information systems. 
• Multiple Security Domains: In combined operations there may be a need 
for more than one coalition security domain that will require more than 
one coalition information-sharing network. Managing multiple coalition 
networks as well as the release of information to them will present a 
challenge to the COCOM. In addition, necessary interaction between these 
multiple coalition networks and U.S. networks will call for innovative 
operational processes to facilitate the accomplishment of the coalition 
mission. 
• Foreign Disclosure: Coalition member nations will adapt their foreign 
disclosure policy to support the sharing of appropriate information with 
their coalition partners. It should be the default position that information 
that will affect the accomplishment of the shared mission and protection of 
coalition forces will be shared as quickly as possible with coalition partner 
nations by the most rapid means, usually the coalition information sharing 
network, CENTRIXS. 
• Information Throughput Capacity: Participating nations must provide 
adequate capacity to the coalition information sharing networks to support 
operational requirements across the full spectrum of their operations. 
• Compatibility of Information Systems: Protocols and other technical 
interfaces of the various systems will comply with international standards 
in order to achieve this concept. Incompatibilities will be addressed and 
resolved within the CCIB processes.  
• Political Factors: Political considerations are significant at every step of 
coalition operations. However, once a coalition is formed, mission 
accomplishment and protection of the coalition forces must be elevated 
into the foreground to support the agreed mission. Coordination at the 
strategic/operational level will be necessary to make the coalition 
information-sharing requirement viable. 
• Agreements Between Members: Members of the coalition may have pre-
established agreements for information/intelligence sharing. These 
agreements will be addressed and resolved bilaterally or within the CCIB 
process as required. 
• Policies: Coalition operations work within established policy guidelines. 
Any issues with existing policy will be documented with proposals for 
change to support a combined operation. These suggested changes may be 




• Language: Coalition operations always introduce the challenge of 
language capabilities for the combined forces. Some of these challenges 
can be addressed partially with technology using language for chat or 
document translation. However, considerable planning must address this 
critical area in practical terms and in view of the envisioned combined C2 
processes. As a practical matter, English will be assumed to be the default 
language for CENTRIXS-supported operations. 
E. MISSION REQUIREMENTS 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) demonstrated the need to share relevant 
information between coalition partners conducting the full spectrum of combined military 
operations.  When coalitions are established, coalition information-sharing requirements 
are identified and vetted collectively by coalition members.  Limiting factors to be 
initially considered are bilateral agreements, foreign disclosure requirements, individual 
participants’ information technology capabilities, foreign material sales agreements, and 
the ability to release (loan or sell) communications security devices.  
To achieve economies of scale in coalition systems and solutions, a structured 
process prioritizing common coalition information exchange requirements is necessary.  
The C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence) information 
exchange requirements (IERs) for real-world operations have been identified, and are 
being assessed and validated for coalition forces.  Coalition partners will compare the 
long-term interoperability requirements to the IERs using the CCIB (or similar) forum.  
Each participating nation will establish formal mechanisms in accordance with their 
national policies and procedures for the release of information to the other participating 
nations.  Commanders will decide what information is to be shared based on the 
requirements of the mission assigned (USCENTCOM, 10, 2003.) 
Access to information needed to conduct full spectrum operations is controlled, as 
determined by each coalition member nation’s overall level of participation and need to 
know. Not all information will be shared with all partners; however, it is critical that the 
default be to share rather than to withhold.  The decision to withhold information should 
be largely determined based on the risk to successful accomplishment of any mission and 
protection of the combined operational forces involved in specific operations.  
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CENTRIXS will support the secure exchange of classified information under established 
disclosure policies in a wide variety of physical and virtual environments in accordance 
with the national directives of the participating nations (USCENTCOM, 10, 2003.)  
Security domains on CENTRIXS within the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 
allow members within a common operational community the ability to access relevant 
information necessary to support the corresponding operation.  These domains facilitate 
the sharing of released information essential in conducting crisis action planning and 
mission execution.  These domains must provide protection for each participating 
nation’s classified or sensitive military and/or civilian information.  Nations participating 
in these security domains must ensure information they receive is not compromised. 
Information that is electronically shared will be classified and labeled appropriately 
(CENTRIXS CONOPS, 21, 2001.) 
The sharing of intelligence information in support of a pending operation is 
absolutely necessary.  Threats to the CJTF are pervasive and may come from a wide 
variety of sources as demonstrated in OEF.  Therefore, each participating nation needs to 
share information from many sources including law enforcement, economic, political, 
infrastructure, organizational, or military perspectives to enable coalition operations to 
achieve rapid success using the appropriate level of resources.  Analysis of this fused 
intelligence will ensure national assets provided by each participating nation would best 
be used to disable the adversary.  Development of coalition operational plans based on a 
broad spectrum of all source intelligence enables the right force levels to be employed in 
theater to be operationally successful while limiting the joint force commander’s force 
protection and logistics problem (USCENTCOM, 18, 2003.) 
The United States and other nations have standing agreements with other alliances 
and coalitions to include bilateral and multilateral agreements. In the coalition 
information-sharing environment these agreements must be upheld when a CENTRIXS 
network is fielded.  Emphasis in the production of information, especially intelligence, 
should be on the content and not on the sources or technical capabilities used to collect or 
develop it. To allow rapid reprioritization of assets to meet future objectives in on-going 
operations, post mission assessment must be available in the coalition information-
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sharing environment. All members have to be able to evaluate (at any given time) the 
progress of the operation to best apply the assets they have committed (CENTRIXS 
CONOPS, 43, 2001.) 
The 24-hour, 365-day operation of the CENTRIXS network provides connectivity 
and access within each nation at the appropriate level while maintaining the established 
security requirements of each participant. Secure connections between the CENTRIXS 
network communication backbone and existing national C2 (Command and Control) 
systems are provided as appropriate. Maintenance of the CENTRIXS network is the 
responsibility of the coalition nations subject to negotiation of the participants. No single 
nation should be the sole source for maintaining CENTRIXS; generally each nation will 
maintain its own CENTRIXS systems.  The coalition information-sharing environment is 
capable of global operations as required.  Therefore, CENTRIXS networks are 
interoperable and connected (as appropriate) at some level with other networks 
(Boardman, 17, 2004.)  
CENTRIXS is implemented as a set of secure networks; a set of common 
applications; a set of common Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP); 
internationally-accepted encryption capabilities; standardized information formats; and 
required categories of information for exchange with coalition partners supporting a full 
spectrum of operations worldwide.  It supports education and training for operational and 
tactical staff planning, leveraging the principles of distributed learning such as specific 
standards and architecture.  It takes advantage of commercially available systems to 
execute global operations in accordance with the GIG Architecture.  The ability to 
exchange near-real-time information is scalable, deployable, and adaptable for the type of 
information services required of a CJTF (CENTRIXS CONOPS, 11, 2001.) 
F. PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS 
Users at all levels (strategic, operational, and tactical) and of all functional areas 
(e.g., operations, intelligence, logistics) of CENTRIXS require the ability to interact with 
all members of the combined military forces using the CENTRIXS capabilities.  
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Additional capabilities can be provided using CENTRIXS networks based on the 
individual requirements of the COCOM/Combined Command or their Components to 
support air, land or maritime combined operations. 
Authorized use of CENTRIXS includes planning and preparation for, and 
execution of combined military operations.  All functions of military operations are 
addressed:  personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics.  These activities will include 
(Boardman, 2004): 
• Operational Planning: Those activities involved with identifying, 
marshalling, and organizing assigned combined forces and with the 
collection, management, and sharing of intelligence to support this 
planning and preparation for combined military operations, as well as 
planning for their employment. These would include operations, 
intelligence, and logistics planning documents.  
• Direction and Redirection of Forces: Those activities associated with 
executing operational plans and contingencies during combined military 
operations. These would include operations orders as well as fragmentary 
orders. 
• Reporting of Events and Activity: Those activities involving the reporting 
of activity in a near real time and non-near real time manner, such as 
operational, intelligence, and logistics reporting. 
G. ARCHITECTURE DESCRIPTION 
In all views of the CENTRIXS architecture, certain basic principles and concepts 
will govern design and implementation.  These principles are (Boardman, 2004): 
• Regional Organization: CENTRIXS is a global system that is regionally 
organized and connects the Regional COCOMs (i.e., USCENTCOM, 
USEUCOM, USNORTHCOM, USPACOM, and USSOUTHCOM) in a 
secure virtual coalition network. U.S. and coalition nations and forces are 
connected to these regional commands as appropriate; in addition, other 
agencies and organizations are connected to the most appropriate 
CENTRIXS point of presence (CENTRIXS CONOPS, 14, 2001.) 
• Centralized Management - Delegated Implementation: The CENTRIXS 
configuration and its associated standards are centrally managed by the 
CPMO, but operational implementation has been delegated to the 
COCOMs.  The global CENTRIXS physical infrastructure (the 
connections between COCOMs) is managed by the Defense Information 
Systems Agency (DISA).  
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• Open Systems Architecture is integral to the design of CENTRIXS. The 
use of this design approach will allow for modularity in CENTRIXS 
evolution in response to the requirements of its users. The ability to 
respond to new technologies, new requirements, and new operational 
environments demands an open systems approach that permits flexible and 
responsive change to this environment. 
• Use of COTS rather than Proprietary solutions: A global system which is 
interoperable not only with a wide variety of U.S. entities, but also with 
changing groupings of multinational partners, at all levels of warfare 
(strategic, operational, tactical), cannot be tied to the limitations that are 
represented by proprietary solutions. Wherever possible, Commercial off-
the-shelf (COTS) and Government off-the-shelf (GOTS) are used in lieu 
of proprietary solutions. In particular, the interfaces and data exchange 
standards must be open to the extent that varying users (U.S. and 
Coalition) can select their own solutions, but still interoperate with others 
using CENTRIXS. 
• Use of International Standards: International standards are the guideline in 
a system that has coalition users. For example, standards for web activity 
and data exchange (such as HTML and various versions of XML) will use 
the standards set by the W3C so that the greatest number of users can 
participate and evolve as these standards evolve. In addition, various ISO 
standards will be used whenever possible so that the greatest number of 
users will know “what the rules are.” 
1. System Scope 
CENTRIXS provides a coalition C2 capability for any combined operation 
involving U.S. forces.  CENTRIXS provides a standard set of COTS and GOTS software.  
These applications provide core services to include (Boardman, 12, 2004): 
• Microsoft Office: Microsoft (MS) Office is the standard tool for creating 
and editing textual and spreadsheet documents and graphic presentations. 
MS Office is a suite of software applications that includes MS Word, MS 
Excel, MS PowerPoint, and MS Outlook. MS Word is used for textual 
documents, MS Excel for spreadsheets, and MS PowerPoint for 
presentations and briefings. 
• Web Browsing: Netscape and MS Internet Explorer are the web browsing 
applications operators can use to navigate the CENTRIXS web. The 
CENTRIXS web server is populated with finished operational documents 
and intelligence products.  
 
 18
• E-mail: MS Outlook is the application used to pass e-mail between 
CENTRIXS users via a secure intranet or the SIPRNET in order to 
exchange information quickly and securely.  E-mail is a fast and easy way 
for users to communicate information and coordinate activities with one or 
more participants at once. 
• Collaboration: CENTRIXS collaborative tools are used to provide 
coalition members a quick and easy way to conduct real-time business 
over great distances and with many participants. MS NetMeeting is used 
as the collaborative tool for CENTRIXS, but other COTS products are 
also in use (i.e. Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP) and whiteboard 
services). To facilitate information sharing among CENTRIXS users, a 
file sharing system can be established. In addition, secure voice telephones 
can be supported over CENTRIXS; in combined operations, this is often 
the only means available of this type. 
• C2 Personal Computer (C2PC): The C2PC is a Windows map-based 
application supporting the Platform Track component of the SADP.  C2PC 
allows CENTRIXS users to view and filter the SADP data tracks, 
regardless of origin, to better suit specific needs and missions. The display 
provides: 
• Locations and available status of friendly, neutral, and enemy 
assets. 
• Planned movement information for friendly, neutral, and enemy 
assets. 
• Information that could impact the disposition of friendly, neutral, 
and enemy assets (e.g., weather, Battle Damage Assessment 
(BDA.) 
• Operator generated features and projections such as operating 
zones, friendly and enemy activity, air corridors, and missile 
engagement zones. 
• Force position projections. 
• Releasable Modernized Integrated Database (MIDB): An extract of the 
theater-level and national agency-produced U.S.-only classified MIDB.  
• The Imagery Transformation Services (ITS): To store and provide links to 
releasable nation and tactical images.  ITS allows rapid access, query, and 
manipulation of these images, thus providing tactical operators and 
intelligence analysts better insight into current and future operations. 
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2. Support Environment 
Hardware and software for CENTRIXS consists of a standardized combination of 
GOTS and COTS materials, all of which are available and releasable to foreign partners 
for purchase, lease, or loan. It is imperative that the forward deployed site personnel be 
qualified to carry out the routine functions of installation, operations, and maintenance 
for these networks. To ease the burden on the forward deployed personnel, the more 
complex, difficult functions have been centralized to areas under less stress that are 
staffed with support personnel with a higher level of training and expertise. In some cases 
this centralization will be to a deployed Theatre Communications Control Center 
(TCCC), and in other cases, the COCOM or to the CNCC as appropriate. 
The support environment includes network control centers located at the global 
CNCC, and at each of the COCOMs (DoD Instruction 8110.1, 7, 2004.)  The CNCC 
primary functions include: 
• Provide Global Services 
• Global Monitoring & Tuning 
• Secure the Network & Detect Intrusions 
• Provide Connections (Cross-Command and to other government 
organizations) 
The global services to be provided by the CNCC are:  
• Root Domain Name Service 
• Global Address List Synchronization 
• Virus Signature Updates 
• Patches & Software Updates 
• Cross-Command Services (e-mail, collaboration, search engine) 
The support concept mirrors that of traditional automated networks. There are 
basically five entities in any support plan; the site administrators, the NOC, the TCCC at 
each of the COCOMS, the CENTRIXS Enterprise support Team (consisting of help desk 
and support network/systems engineers), and the CNCC. 
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3. Personnel Assessment 
The following summarizes the CENTRIXS jobs and general duties identified as to 
be the typical fleet defined CENTRIXS manpower requirement: 
• CENTRIXS Users:  Users are personnel assigned and authorized to 
perform the day-to-day coalition coordination and communication using 
the chat, web, mail, COP and collaboration features of CENTRIXS. 
• CENTRIXS System Administrators:  System Administrators are personnel 
assigned responsibility for performing very limited network 
administration, management, net health and analysis of the CENTRIXS 
system. 
• CENTRIXS Web Administrators:  Web Administrators are personnel 
assigned to manage websites and content.  They tailor the website's look 
and feel, how links and postings are managed. 
• CENTRIXS Maintainer:  Currently the CENTRIXS Maintainer function is 
defined and assigned to the ISM Technician.  Built-in system security 
lockdowns and very limited administrator permissions restrict users and 
administrators to only the most basic troubleshooting and repair activities.  
Network problems beyond the simple re-boot and re-image level will 
nearly always require on-site technical assistance from CENTRIXS 
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) with full System Administrator rights and 
accesses.  Mitigation considerations are: 
• Trained IT technicians are often assigned as System 
Administrators and would naturally assume the limited 
troubleshooting maintenance responsibilities if required. 
• Non-technical system administrators, departmental or directorate 
representatives could safely be called upon to perform the very 
limited set of troubleshooting and maintenance actions authorized 
for ship's force. 
There is no increase in manpower assessed to be needed at this time.  Initial 
manpower analysis did identify certain CENTRIXS duties.  However, it was determined 
that CENTRIXS fielding adds no additional manpower requirements in the fleet.  The 
workload associated with CENTRIXS implementation is easily offset by the labor 
savings that this and other new IT systems have generated. 
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4. End Users 
The CPMO provides oversight and management of the engineering, development, 
integration, and implementation of the CENTRIXS network(s) currently in use by the 
COCOMs.  The CPMO manages the CENTRIXS configuration and is the authority for 
CENTRIXS networks and systems.  The CPMO is also responsible for expanding 
CENTRIXS connectivity to COCOMs and providing global CENTRIXS connectivity 




Figure 1.   Command Relationships (From: USCENTCOM, 16, 2001) 
The Regional COCOMs, their Components, and nations in their respective AORs 
are the primary users of CENTRIXS. The JFCOM (Joint Forces Command) also has 
CENTRIXS installations to support the development of doctrine and procedures, as well 
as to support experimentation and exercises.  Other COCOMs, Components, and 
Agencies are expected also to request the appropriate CENTRIXS variants so that they 
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Service Components, some National Agencies, and participating nations will be 
connected to CENTRIXS global information sharing networks.  The 
COCOM/Combined/Component Command J2s, Intelligence Directorates, and their staffs 
are responsible for providing intelligence-related functional support to assist in the 
accomplishment of the Command’s mission.  This includes intelligence operations, 
training, intelligence dissemination, requests for information, documentation, and 
requirements management.  The J2s provide vision, guidance, and direction for 
intelligence sharing through CENTRIXS.  
The COCOM/Combined/Component Command J3s, Operations Directorates, are 
responsible for C2 using CENTRIXS.  As the Command’s coalition C2 network, J3s lead 
the command’s efforts to ensure successful implementation of the CENTRIXS network 
throughout the command. 
The COCOM/Combined/Component Command J4s, Logistics Directorates, are 
responsible for logistical support using CENTRIXS.  As the Command’s coalition C2 
network, J4s use CENTRIXS to coordinate movement, maintenance, and supply 
throughout the command (DoD INST 8110.1, 4, 2004.) 
The COCOM/Combined/Component Command J5s, Plans and Policy 
Directorates, are responsible for the Coalition Coordination Cell (CCC).  The CCC is 
made up of both regional and non-regional nations who have demonstrated a willingness 
to participate with the international community in engagement and contingencies in the 
COCOMs’ AOR.  The mission of the CCC is to facilitate strategic/operational integration 
of coalition forces with U.S. contingency operations in the AOR (DoD INST 8110.1, 5, 
2004.) 
The COCOM/Combined/Component Command J6s, Communications 
Directorates, are responsible for designing solutions to stated requirements for 
CENTRIXS and are responsible for installing, managing, operating, and sustaining their 
portion of the CENTRIXS networks.  J6s will evaluate CENTRIXS requirements and 
coordinate installation plans with appropriate service components for CENTRIXS 
networks within their AOR to satisfy those requirements.  J6s will also coordinate with 
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the foreign nation to ensure the proposed solution is compatible with their capabilities.  
CENTRIXS support personnel assigned to deployed locations manage the operation of 
the forward CENTRIXS gateway(s).  Coalition nations are responsible for operation of 
equipment and systems in their respective national facilities and are responsible for their 
own communications links to the U.S.-controlled gateways.  
U.S. and foreign nation military staffs and their forces will access CENTRIXS 
either as members of combined headquarters or staffs, or as national forces operationally 
controlled by a combined force headquarters.  Through CENTRIXS, the many coalition 
partners are able to share classified information through an automated web-based 
interoperable system, giving the U.S., its allies, and coalition partners the ability to easily 
share information on a near-real-time basis.  CENTRIXS networks are implemented in a 
way that may be easily expanded when necessary.  
In addition to the COCOMs, CENTRIXS is often connected to U.S. embassies in 
each nation that has CENTRIXS connectivity.  The workstations will be installed in the 
Defense Attaché Office (DAO) and will provide the Defense Attaché (DATT) with a 
means to stay “in the loop” with the needs of the host nations’ Ministries of Defense 
(MOD).  DAOs can then better facilitate information exchanges between those nations 
and the COCOM. 
H. ARCHITECTURE EVALUATION 
In evaluating the CENTRIXS architecture, there are three possible methods, 
specifically:  ATAM, Software Architecture Analysis Method (SAAM), and Active 
Reviews for Intermediate Design (ARID) (Clements, 33, 2002.)  ATAM is the most 
comprehensive method and is applied after the architecture design approaches have been 
chosen.  It has the advantage revealing how well an architecture fulfills certain quality 
goals, but also how they interact.  SAAM is a less intensive process, where key 
architectural insights are gained through brainstormed scenarios looking for weaknesses 
in quality attribute requirements. It is beneficial for quickly assessing many quality 
attributes of the architecture.  Lastly, ARID is used most often during the architecture 
design and covers the suitability of the design approach (Shannon, 2007.) 
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The driving architectural requirements, as well as the architectural approaches are 
discussed in the previous sections.  To evaluate the architecture, the functional 
requirements of CENTRIXS will first be enumerated and the measures of performance 
and effectiveness specified.  The priority quality attributes will be highlighted.  In the 
absence of stakeholder input, scenario-based methods will be used to assess if the 
CENTRIXS architectural approaches meet the quality attributes it sets out to achieve. 
The CENTRIXS high-level architecture diagram (See Appendix B) represents a 
top-level view of the operational architecture highlighting the interactions between the 
CENTRIXS architecture and its environment, and between the architecture and external 
systems.  The graphic depicts all CENTRIXS traffic leaving the U.S. and coalition 
partner ships through satellite communications (SATCOM) to reach the NOCs.  As 
shown, there is no ship-to-ship capability without routing through the NOC.  Traffic is 
instead routed to U.S. forces and coalition partners ashore and afloat from the U.S. and 
coalition partner NOCs.   
The functional requirements in CENTRIXS can be categorized into the following 
capability areas:  (Each function is taken from the Common Systems Function List 
(CSFL)) (Shannon, 2007.) 
• Enterprise Application Support Services 
• Perform Briefing and Presentation Services 
• Perform Calculation Services 
• Create, Manipulate, Produce, and Convert Documents 
• Produce and Manage Audio and Graphic Media 
• Data Management Services 
• Enterprise System Services 
• Control Operation of Computer 
• Provide Network / Network Application Services 
• Provide Transport Services 
• Storage Management 
A detailed listing of the functional requirements and description are listed below.  
The key quality attributes of the system, which can be seen in Appendix E, are:  
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• Performance:  The performance quality attribute is with respect to the 
information domain. The quality of performance can be assessed through 
TRAC (i.e. timeliness, relevance, accuracy, comprehensiveness.) 
• Availability: CENTRIXS must satisfy the definition of operational 
availability meeting or exceeding the threshold value of greater than or 
equal to 95 percent and the objective value of greater than or equal to 99 
percent. 
• Security: CENTRIXS systems must be protected from network attacks by 
providing a firewall, intrusion detection, virus checking and other 
Computer Network Defense (CND) functions.  The threshold is 
incorporation and maintenance of network firewalls for each CENTRIXS 
enclave at the NOCs’ boundaries with CENTRIXS Global, installation and 
regular operation of virus checking systems.  The objective is integration 
of CND functionality into all CENTRIXS systems. 
• Modifiability:  CENTRIXS, within the hardware support limitations of the 
afloat variants, must provide tools and procedures for the cost-effective 
changeover and addition of coalitions.  The threshold is manual 
changeover or addition of coalition enclaves and COIs to CENTRIXS 
afloat installations.  The objective is automated changeover or addition of 
enclaves to CENTRIXS installations.  Each enclave maintains 
connectivity to other nations and other non-Navy U.S. Commands, 
Services, and Agencies (C/S/A) participating in CENTRIXS networks.  
The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) operates the 
CENTRIXS Global network, through which connectivity is provided to 
other C/S/As and participating nations.  CENTRIXS interconnections with 
the CENTRIXS Global network and in some cases, directly to other 
nations, are built and maintained at the NOCs. 
• Usability:  CENTRIXS must be capable of being restored after an 
operational mission software fault with a threshold Mean Corrective 
Maintenance Time for Operational Mission Failures-Software 
(MCMTOMF-sw) time of less than 1.5 hours and an objective of less than 
30 minutes.  Maintenance personnel must be capable of repairing 
CENTRIXS after an operational mission hardware fault with a threshold 
Mean Corrective Maintenance Time for Operational Mission Failures-
Hardware (MCMTOMF-hw) time of less than 4 hours and an objective of 
less than 3 hours.  All activity interfaces, services, policy-enforcement 
controls, and data-sharing of the Net-Centric Operations and Warfare 
Reference Model (NCOW-RM) and GIG Key Interface Profiles (KIPs) 
will be satisfied to the requirements of the specific Joint Integrated 
Architecture (JIA) products (including data correctness, data availability 
and data processing), and information assurance accreditation, specified in 
the Threshold (T) and Objective (O) values.  CENTRIXS shall meet the 
threshold value by satisfying 100 percent of the interfaces; services; 
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policy-enforcement controls; and data correctness, availability and 
processing requirements designated as enterprise-level or mission critical 
in the Joint integrated architecture.  CENTRIXS shall meet the objective 
value by satisfying 100 percent of the interfaces; services; policy-
enforcement controls; and data correctness, availability and processing 
requirements in the Joint integrated architectures. 
1. Modifiability 
Modifiability is the ability to rapidly share information with a dynamically 
changing combination of coalition forces.  This capability must provide for a seamless 
exchange of C2 information with allied and coalition partners.  COCOMs, as situations 
warrant, will assemble dynamically changing coalitions in response to assigned mission 
requirements.  C2 networks to support these coalitions need to be easily established, 
changed, and eventually disestablished as requirements change in support of the 
commander’s mission needs.  The organization of specific forces assigned, both U.S. and 
multination, will vary greatly.  Under normal circumstances, CENTRIXS will provide the 
connection to the headquarters of these forces down to the level required by the COCOM.  
CENTRIXS will allow the secure exchange of information by all elements of these 
headquarters and units assigned to include operations, intelligence, and logistics 





Figure 2.   Modifiability Characterization 
A current scenario to illustrate the quality attribute of modifiability exists in 
modern operations in the Middle East.  The current solution is for U.S. Central Command 
(USCENTCOM) to field separate COI networks and individual bilateral networks in 
support of the war on terrorism and theater specific objectives.  The CENTRIXS-GCTF 
supports Operation Enduring Freedom and has been designated the coalition network for 
all maritime forces in the USCENTCOM AOR.  CENTRIXS-MCFI supports OIF, and is 
the primary C2 tool/system of record for OIF security and stability operations.  
CENTRIXS Four Eyes (CFE) supports information exchange between the United States 
and its Commonwealth allies (Boardman, 11, 2004).  Figure 3 shows the various 
coalitions within CENTRIXS. 
 28
 
Figure 3.   CENTRIXS Coalition Organization (From: Boardman, 12, 2004) 
The information sharing challenge exists, as there are no information data 
exchanges between enclaves.  Coalition forces will continue to play a vital role in current 
and future operations; however, nation organization within the enclaves will continually 
change.  Multiple coalitions, international organizations, and alliances participating in 
different operations will further complicate the information sharing challenge as well.  
Analysis performed in this thesis reveals that the need to manage these enclaves is 
paramount to the success of CENTRIXS.  
• Vulnerability:  The architecture’s current information sharing policies are 
adequate to handle the various coalition additions and exchanges, however 
many inconsistencies are discovered.  A lack of manageable technical 
solutions, data owner guidance from various nations, and an onerous 
accreditation and certification process have all contributed to a lack of 
seamless data dissemination.  This can result in the creation of multiple, 
separate networks to address these issues that have consumed limited 
resources and manpower. 
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• Sensitivity:  A key sensitivity for the enclave management and 
modifiability attribute is the impact on coalition nations as the state of the 
world changes.  With the number of participants in operations throughout 
the world, it is necessary to minimize the impact on current members 
while diplomatically removing coalition partners.  Political, economic, 
cultural, technical, and military differences with partners continue to make 
it difficult for the theater commanders to achieve effective modifiability. 
2. Security 
As identified by the GIG Integrated Architecture, the consequences of an attack 
against the National Security enterprises will be far greater than lost Internet transactions 
(Shannon, 2007.)  Through relatively unsophisticated attacks such as viruses, Trojan 
horses, worms, spyware, and other malicious code, business operations can be, and have 
been, brought to a halt for hours or even days.  This could include the loss and/or theft of 
data that may never be recovered.  Adversaries reading, writing, modifying or destroying 
information could allow unfriendly forces to influence our decisions or determine our 
actions before they are executed.  The potential consequences of a cyber attack could 
include denied ability to achieve mission objectives, loss of life, and denied control of 
U.S. weapon systems (including the possibility of turning our own weapon systems 
against us). 
The projected threat environment in which the CENTRIXS system will operate 
includes an established and continually growing number of worldwide entities capable of 
conducting Information Operations (IO).  Some subsets of these most likely threats have 
specific tasking against U.S. communications, networks, and computer systems.  
Analysis performed in this thesis revealed that a division of IO, Computer Network 
Operations (CNO), can be further broken down into four categories: 
• Compromise-of-Information: When an adversary gains access to allied 
information either by making an electronic copy of material in transit or 
by gaining access to the host machine.  An example is a network 
consisting of a secret system and an unclassified system, where secret 
information exfiltrates from the secret system to the unclassified system.  
This could occur as a result of operator error, system failure, or a 
malicious attack. 
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• Data Deception or Corruption:  When the data contained in a system or 
being transmitted over a data or sensor link is modified (intentional or 
not).  For example, corruption can occur during low to high data transfer if 
the data on the low side contains malicious code.  A compromised low 
side Web asset that redirects traffic to a hostile nation-state is a form of 
deception 
• Information Denial or Loss:  When access to needed information is 
disrupted. This is typically seen as a denial of service, destruction of 
transport mechanisms, or signal jamming. 
• Physical Destruction or Damage.  When the original state of a system’s 
physical components is altered or destroyed. The physical threat for cross-
domain networks is the same as for any Information Technology (IT) or 
Information Assurance (IA) system (Clements, 89, 2002.) 
The CENTRIXS system is vulnerable to internal and external threats. These 
threats could target core functions and the interconnected sensor and communications 
systems. These threats are worldwide in origin, technically diverse, multifaceted, and 
growing rapidly.  These security threats will be the stimuli in the characterization of this 
quality attribute. Some of the architectural decisions based on a four-layered approach are 
also suggested to achieve the goals of availability, confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, 
and non-repudiation.  Figure 4 shows the security attribute characterization. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Security Characterization 
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A scenario-based approach is taken to analyze the quality attribute of security. 
CENTRIXS incorporates and maintains network firewalls for each CENTRIXS enclave 
at the NOCs’ boundaries with CENTRIXS Global. Also, host and network intrusion 
detection, as well as virus checking are integrated into all CENTRIXS systems.  The 
CENTRIXS system is currently in full compliance with the DoD Directive 8500.1 and 
has made the required Information Assurance documentation available to the Joint Staff 
J-6 for review (Shannon, 2007.) 
CENTRIXS employs certified security-enabled information technology to support 
responsive movement of approved data from U.S.-only sources.  This includes e-mail 
guards for e-mail with the SIPRNET, Radiant Mercury guards for formatted message text 
data and imagery, Multi-level Database Replication/Security Bridge for Order of battle 
files and one-way fiber systems for file and database transfers.  Standing Foreign 
Disclosure procedures and training provide the structure and process for approving 
disclosure and release of data to foreign partners.  In our opinion, CENTCOM uses 
current but limited approved guarding solutions to enhance information flow between the 
SIPRNET and CENTRIXS.  
• Vulnerability:  CENTRIXS ought to take special cognizance of the 
inherent risk of trusted partners within enclaves due to the multiple 
communities. A more comprehensive security approach needs to be 
instituted, to provide a seamless, interoperable, multi-classification level 
information exchange between coalition partners.  To transition fully from 
an air-gapped environment for seamless, robust multilateral and bilateral 
information sharing, CENTRIXS should expand baseline services and 
infrastructure to integrate commercial multi-domain and multi-level 
information exchange capabilities as these technologies are developed, 
tested, and certified.  
• Sensitivity:  Technical solutions such as usage traceability and archiving 
of member logs may be required to allow detailed investigation or 
preventive auditing.  Also, such solutions would need to account for 




CENTRIXS must meet relevant MCMTOMF software and hardware 
requirements, in order to minimize operational down time and maintain availability of 
CENTRIXS services.  In order to achieve the usability goals, Figure 5 illustrates the 
usability characterization, which employs hardware and software redundancy. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Usability Characterization 
There is very little information regarding “how” the CENTRIXS architecture 
contributes to the Usability objectives.  Key Performance Attributes (KPAs) were listed 
that provided information on the importance of maintaining adaptable and efficient 
services.  Hardware and software redundancy can be assumed to be included in the 
CENTRIXS systems.  The CENTRIXS system shall be fielded in compliance with the IA 
policies documented in the Department of Defense (DoD) Directive8500.1 and the IA 
security requirements documented in the DoD Instruction 8500.2.  Any unsatisfied IA 
policies and requirements shall be addressed with an appropriate and corresponding Risk 
Level (Bayer, 2007.) 
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• Vulnerability:  CENTRIXS is web-centric and commercial off-the-shelf 
(COTS) focused.  Implementation focuses on fielding core information 
services first, including e-mail, web-based data access, file sharing, 
collaboration, and near-real time data access.  The system is comprised of 
commercially available computers and network equipment.  Redundancy 
can be achieved efficiently through COTS technologies; however, an 
entire system may be vulnerable or susceptible to a particular failure or 
threat.  Software applications are both COTS and GOTS.  CENTRIXS 
includes a web-based, multinational-releasable application set to provide 
the desktop and data infrastructure elements.  Due to the increasing 
software complexity, the CENTRIXS systems are more susceptible and 
sensitive to bugs.  The testing and certification process aims to reduce the 
probability of a software failure, although is not perfect.   
• Sensitivity:  The CENTRIXS applications allow the user to access the 
order of battle and imagery databases and to display the data on a map 
background.  A CENTRIXS workstation user is able to access browser-
based products and databases, receive and display track data feeds on a 
map background, send e-mail with attachments, and conduct collaboration 
sessions.  With coalition operations becoming more prevalent and 
widespread, the important hardware and software aspects must not be 
overlooked. 
I. CONCLUSION 
A developing crisis in the world often results in the requirement for a COCOM to 
prepare, implement and execute a plan for the potential use of military force to carry out 
a mission in support of the national interest in accordance with the Unified Command 
Plan (UCP).  Due to dependency on other nations’ support for basing, access to airspace, 
logistic support, and for troop contributions, the COCOM must include these nations in 
planning efforts.  The responsible COCOM and his/her Coalition partners must 
accomplish those labors together.  Through a political process orchestrated at the level of 
the COCOM, a coalition of nations is formed who have agreed on a common purpose to 
deal with the developing crisis. In order to enable responsive information sharing with 
these nations, the use of CENTRIXS is necessary to establish a common architecture for 
effective operations. 
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III. INCREASING THE VALUE OF CENTRIXS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the infrastructure of current CENTRIXS nodes, and 
suggests changes to those structures in order to maximize their value.  Through a detailed 
analysis and research of the core capabilities of current CENTRIXS nodes and their “AS-
IS” processes, this chapter develops the “To-Be” and “Radical” processes and provides a 
Knowledge Value Added (KVA) analysis in order to suggest ways to improve the nodes’ 
structure and efficiency. 
By reviewing and analyzing the documentation provided by PMW-160, we hope 
to accurately map the CENTRIXS core processes and produce a product, which will 
assist the program office with completing the acquisition process and will help eventually 
make CENTRIXS an official Program of Record (POR) at NPS.  In order to map the 
process and determine KVA for the CENTRIXS “AS-IS” process, we will address the 
following key issues and concerns: 
• Identify the core sub-processes, which comprise the CENTRIXS process. 
• Identify the average number of personnel required to support a 
CENTRIXS node. 
• Identify both the average number, and types of services produced each 
day. 
• Identify the percentage of total services being provided by each sub-
process. 
• Create a process flowchart for the “AS-IS”, “To-Be” and “RADICAL” 
processes. 
• Create an Excel Spreadsheet in order to calculate KVA for the “AS-IS”, 
“To-Be”, and “RADICAL” processes. 
Our expectation is that thorough research of the core sub-processes we will be 
able to determine the KVA for CENTRIXS nodes.  PMW-160 is currently focused on 
obtaining POR status for the system, and is smoothing the Capability Planning Document  
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(CPD) to go before the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).  Although, this 
thesis does not directly support the CPD, it should provide useful information regarding 
the management, services, and value of CENTRIXS. 
B. MAKING CHANGES 
PMW-160 provided the valuable high-level details required to define the “AS-IS” 
process and perform a KVA analysis.  They provided detailed information such as the 
number of active CENTRIXS nodes, estimated number of customers per node, and the 
services common to all customers (Bayer, 2007.)  The Networks, Information Assurance 
(IA), and Enterprise Services Program Office provides information infrastructure 
supporting client applications in the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, 
and Intelligence (C4I) networks environment.  Figure 6 depicts the service-based 
architecture with information exchanges between operational nodes both external, and 
internal to the system.  Need lines 1-7 show the external information exchanges across 
the CENTRIXS boundary between the non-CENTRIXS operators and resources and the 
CENTRIXS COP, collaboration services, email services, directory services, information 
repository services, web services and security/account management services.  
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Figure 6.   Operational Node Connectivity Description Overview 
CENTRIXS currently exists as a web-centric, Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) 
based global network that permits multi-national information sharing.  The CENTRIXS 
core sub-processes provide allied and coalition forces with information services such as 
e-mail, web services, collaboration, and products such as Global C2 System Integrated 
Imagery and Intelligence (GCCS-I3) components for the Common Operational Picture 
(COP), Common Intelligence Picture (CIP), near real-time intelligence, and integrated 
imagery.  PMW-160 is currently managing the acquisition of the critical CENTRIXS 
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system in the Navy’s afloat and shore NOC environments as a project until the formal 
Navy CENTRIXS POR is established.  CENTRIXS Increment 1 is proposed to enter the 
Acquisition cycle as an Acquisition Category (ACAT) III program with a Milestone C 
decision briefing scheduled for 2nd Quarter FY08.  Program Executive Office C4I (PEO 
C4I) will be the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) (Brewin, 15, 2007.) 
CENTRIXS uses the Automated Digital Network System (ADNS) as the Internet 
Protocol (IP) gateway to ships and naval shore Operators via current satellite 
communications (SATCOM) links.  The CENTRIXS program incorporates and adapts a 
variety of COTS hardware and software and GOTS software.  Figure 7 illustrates the 
relationships among organizations or organization types that are the key players in 
architecture.  These key players correspond to the operational nodes, which contain added 
detail on how the key players interact together in order to conduct their corresponding 
operational activities.   
 
Figure 7.   Organizational Relationship Chart Overview 
CENTRIXS provides simultaneous access to multiple enclaves using Thin Client 
System architecture to reduce the Space, Weight, and Power (SWaP) footprint aboard 
Unit and Force Level platforms (Shannon, 2007.)  The design complies with Open 
System Architecture (OSA) and Defense Information Systems Registry (DISR) guidance 
to ensure flexibility and interoperability.  Through spiral development, successive 
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increments will incorporate new equipment, interfaces, and additional CDS capabilities, 
which will expand on the capabilities of the CENTRIXS Increment 1 configuration.  The 
ultimate goal is to continue to incorporate CDS capabilities into CENTRIXS to support 
the transition to the MNIS program (DoD 8110.1, 2004.) 
The phone conversations, documentation, and research provided a clear 
understanding of the “AS-IS” CENTRIXS process.  However, the relationship between 
the core sub-processes, number of services provided, number of customers being 
serviced, and the manpower required still needed to be correlated.  PMW-160 provided 
additional enlightenment concerning the sub-processes, which made it possible to 
determine how the sub-processes or services are managed.  Therefore, it was possible to 
view the required enterprise services, the PMW 160 processes, and each node in the 
system in order to capture the learning time for personnel performing the services, which 
make up the seven-core CENTRIXS sub-processes.  Further, by successfully identifying 
personnel, roles, training, sub-processes, and the services provided, we were able to 
determine the KVA.  The “AS-IS” process flowchart and KVA Spreadsheets were both 
constructed using the data provided by PMW-160.  Unfortunately, PMW-160 did not 
have accurate data concerning how often personnel actually performed a service or 
function, so our team constructed the model based on our extensive experience working 
on similar systems in similar environments.  Figure 8 shows how all CENTRIXS traffic 
leaving the U.S. and coalition partnerships via SATCOM to reach the NOCs.  There is no 
ship-to-ship capability without routing through the NOC.  From the U.S. and coalition 
partner NOCs, traffic is routed to U.S. forces and Coalition partners ashore and afloat.  
Figure 9 gives an overview of the core sub-processes of CENTRIXS nodes. 
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Figure 9.   CENTRIXS Core Sub-Process Overview (From: Boardman, 2004) 
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C. “AS-IS” TRAINING 
The following Electronics Technicians (ET) and Information Technicians (IT) 
courses and their duration, which provide the foundation for CENTRIXS training are as 
follows: 
• A-531-0046 Journeyman Networking Core (6 Weeks).  This course 
provides the networking systems foundation training to prepare candidates 
for management and administration duties on navy networking systems. 
• A-150-2300 Information System Maintenance Technician (12 Weeks).  
This course provides general navy network systems troubleshooting and 
repair training. 
• A-531-0022 Network Security Vulnerability Technician (6 Weeks).  This 
course prepares trained network administrators to perform security 
vulnerability duties on navy networks. 
• A-531-0045 Advanced Network Analyst (6 Weeks).  This course provides 
trained and experienced navy network administrators with advanced 
training on network management, analysis and troubleshooting. 
• A-531-0009 Information Systems Security Manager Course (2 weeks).  
This course provides trained and experienced Naval Officers and Senior 
Network Administrators with advanced training in the implementation of 
DoD and Navy Information Systems Security Policies. 
These courses award a Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) that identifies the 
holder as possessing specific network skills in addition to their normal rating skills.  
These additional NETC training courses can provide additional indirect training for the 
CENTRIXS System Administrator, but are not offered as part of the standard 
CENTRIXS training under the POR (Soriano, AFCEA, 2007).  Table 2 shows a 
breakdown of client variants, and the number of clients and terminals at various nodes. 
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Aircraft Carrier - 
Nuclear (CVN) 
Force Level 8 30 240 
Amphibious Assault 
(LHA) 
Force Level 2 30 60 
Amphibious Assault 
(LHD) 
Force Level 6 30 180 
Amphibious 
Command (LCC) 
Force Level 2 30 60 
Amphibious (LPD) Unit Level 8 15 120 
Guided Missile 
Cruiser (CG) 
Unit Level 22 15 330 
Guided Missile 
Destroyer (DDG) 
Unit Level 63 15 945 
Network Operation 
Center (NOC) 
Shore 2 Variable; (30) 
As required 
60 
 Total Clients =113 Total Terminals =1995 
 
In addition to the training listed above for ET, CENTRIXS courses are available 
to enhance the benefits of the normal specialty courses.  Table 3 lists critical jobs 
associated with CENTRIXS and the ratings and associated training time required to 
qualify for those jobs. 
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0 Days 730 Days 365 Days 180 Days 1275 Days 
Total Training 
Per Person 
6 Days 796 Days 413 Days 188 days 1403 Days 
Total Training 
Days x number 
of personnel 
6 Days 
X  75 
450 Days  
796 Days 
X  4   
3184 Days 
413 Days 
X  4 
1652 Days 
188 Days 




D. “AS-IS” PERSONNEL 
A CENTRIXS Manpower Assessment working group identified three jobs, 
outlined in Table 4, as being required for CENTRIXS operations (Shannon, 2007.) 
Table 4.   Manpower Assessment 
CENTRIXS JOB TYPICAL RATING/BILLET # ASSIGNED PER SHIP 
OPERATOR OS, IS, CT, FC, ET, IT, OFFICER (7 - 200) Personnel = 75 avg
MAINTAINER IT, ET, CT, FC (2 - 6) Personnel  = 4 avg
SYSTEM ADMIN. IT, ET, CT, FC (2 - 6) Personnel  = 4 avg
WEB ADMIN. IT, IS, OS, OFFICER (1 – 3) Personnel  =  2 avg
 
The following summarizes the CENTRIXS jobs and general duties identified, as 
well as the rating/billet and how many personnel the COMPACFLT training team has 
found to be the typical fleet defined CENTRIXS manpower requirement: 
• CENTRIXS OPERATORS/OPERATORS:  Operators are personnel 
assigned and authorized to perform the day-to-day coalition coordination 
and communication using the chat, web, mail, COP and Collaboration at 
Sea (CAS) features of CENTRIXS.  ALT = 6 Days. 
• CENTRIXS SYSTEM ADMINISTRATORS:  System Administrators are 
personnel assigned responsibility for performing very limited network 
administration, management, net health and analysis of the CENTRIXS 
system. ALT = 413 Days ( 48 specific + 365 core.) 
• CENTRIXS WEB ADMINISTRATORS:  Web Administrators are 
personnel assigned to manage websites and content.  They tailor the 
website's look and feel, how links and postings are managed.  ALT = 188 
Days (8 specific + 180 core.) 
• CENTRIXS MAINTAINER:  Currently the CENTRIXS Maintainer job is 
defined and assigned to the ISM Technician.  Built-in system security 
lockdowns and very limited administrator permissions restrict ship and 
shore forces to only the most basic troubleshooting and repair activities.  
Network problems beyond the simple re-boot and re-image level will 
nearly always require on-site technical assistance from CENTRIXS SMEs 
with full System Administrator rights and accesses.  Mitigation 
considerations are provided below: ALT = 796 Days ( 66 specific + 730 
core) (Shannon, 2007.) 
 45
Electronics Technicians are often assigned as System Administrators and would 
naturally assume the limited troubleshooting maintenance responsibilities if required.  
While Non-ET system administrators could safely be called upon to perform the very 
limited set of troubleshooting and maintenance actions authorized for ship and shore 
forces, there is no increase in manpower perceived to be needed at this time.  Initial 
manpower analysis did identify certain CENTRIXS duties.  However, it was determined 
that CENTRIXS fielding adds no additional manpower requirements in the fleet; only 
additional training.  The workload associated with CENTRIXS is easily offset by the 
labor savings that this and other new IT systems have generated Ship-wide and Fleet-
wide. 
As a result of the aforementioned tables and diagrams, it was possible to prepare 
the KVA analysis and determine the Return on Knowledge (ROK) for the “AS-IS” 
process.  Figure 10 (“AS-IS” Process Flowchart) and Figure 11 (KVA Spreadsheet) 
represent the relative comparison between the seven core sub-processes/services and 
measure the knowledge value for each of the sub-processes.  The “AS-IS” KVA 
Spreadsheet derives value from examining the learning time, or knowledge, created, 
which resides either in the minds of the Operators, Maintainers, System Administrators, 
and Web Administrators, or the embedded IT.  Actual Learning Time (ALT) is defined as 
the time required to train personnel to perform their role in supporting the seven core sub-
processes.  The ALT numbers were provided by PMW 160 and are outlined in the 
CENTRIXS Capabilities Planning Document.  However, the prerequisite learning times 
were also factored in and listed in Table 3.  Nominal Learning Time (NLT) is a normally 
calculated using a second estimate of the knowledge required to perform the sub-
processes obtained from a second source.  However, in the case of CENTRIXS, we were 
unable to determine a second source, and therefore did not attempt to calculate NLT.  
NLT numbers in the figure were derived from the analysis of input obtained from the 
surveys.  Comparing the ALT and the NLT provides a relative ratio between the two, 




the ALT was any total greater than 80%.  If the numbers correlate well, one could assume 
that there is some statistical validity between the two different estimates obtained from 
different sources. 
The ROK is a relative comparison between the Total Benefits and Total Costs 
columns.  The numbers in the ROK column can be used as the origin for determining 
which sub-processes are providing the least amount of value in the overall account 
management process.  Low percentages represent low return and yield low value to 
NAVRES.  It was decided to concentrate on these sub-processes and allocate the 
resources by deleting them, merging them, or increasing their value by decreasing their 
time to complete, thus making them more efficient. 
 
 
Figure 10.   “AS-IS” Process Flowchart 
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Figure 11.   “AS-IS” KVA Spreadsheet with graphs generated in Radial Viewer 
 
E. “AS-IS” SUMMARY 
The quantitative calculation of ROK is the Total Benefits (the numerator) divided 
by the Total Cost (the denominator.)  The numerator (Total Benefits) is the total learning 
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time, which is derived from the ALT multiplied by the number of times the learning is 
fired (number of units/services involved, times the number of people involved in each of 
the sub-processes.) 
The denominator (Total Costs per day) is the time it takes to complete the 
cumulative number of services from all sub-processes, per day, multiplied by the number 
of people involved per unit, multiplied by the times fired (number of times one person 
performs each sub-process per week and per hour).  The percentage of IT was factored 
into the learning of each of the roles since basically all of the services were the same 
level of complexity.  The IT percentage for Operators was determined to be as follows:  
45%, Maintainers 10%, System Administrators 30%, and Web Administrators 30%.  In 
analyzing the “AS-IS” process, we concluded that the issue was not the lack of IT, but 
rather the lack of integration or multi-tasking by the operators at each of the 25 terminals.  
The results of the “AS-IS” analysis made it possible to develop the proposed “To-Be” 
solution in order to comply with the mandatory 30 percent in Operator manning, which 
we imposed on the process to improve efficiency.  The “AS-IS” Process yields a Total K 
= 243,843,916, ROK = 205.11% and ROI = 105.11% 
F. THE PROPOSED “TO-BE” SOLUTION 
The “To-Be” prototype was developed in response to the mandatory 30 percent 
reduction in operator manning.  This prototype is a recommendation and has neither been 
tested, nor is it fully functional.  Therefore, the “To-Be” solution is strictly for analyzing 
the impact of enforcing the mandatory reduction in operators by 30 percent.  The 
assumptions, which were made when designing the “To-Be” prototype, are as follows:   
• The purpose of the prototype is to comply with a 30 percent reduction in 
operator manning vice an attempt to maximize KVA and/or ROI. 
• Each CENTRIXS node will continue to average 25 terminals per 
installation regardless of how the network is manned. 
• Operator manning will be reduced from 25 to 17 per eight hour shift. 
• Operators work an eight-hour shift, while maintainers, system 
administrators, and web administrators work 12-hour shifts. 
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• System administrator manning will be reduced from four to two (one 
person per shift.) 
• Market comparables are based on the Government Service (GS) pay scale 
for equivalent employees based on role.  The following determinations 
were made:  maintainers = GS=5, system administrators = GS-12, and web 
administrators = GS-9. 
The percentage of embedded IT varies based on role.  Based on conversations 
with PMW-160 representatives, the following determination was made for embedded IT 
in order to maximize efficiency:  IT for operators = 75 percent, maintainers = 10 percent, 
system administrators = 30% and web administrators = 30 percent. 
G. “TO-BE” SUMMARY 
The “To-Be” process flowchart and KVA spreadsheet were created in response to 
our self-imposed mandatory 30 percent reduction in CENTRIXS operator manning.  The 
“To-Be” Process Flowchart (Figure 12) illustrates the processes, which were either 
changed, or eliminated to comply with the mandatory reduction in operators.  Both the 
“To-Be” flowchart, and KVA spreadsheet (Figures 12 and 13) reflect a decrease in the 
total number of terminal operators from 75 to 51 per day, which reduces the number of 
operators per shift from 25 to 17.  In addition, we reduced the number of System 
Administrators by 50 percent from 4 to 2.  This mandatory reduction in operators is 
achievable through using split screens and empowering personnel to multi-task.  Since 
the average time for firing knowledge is approximately 20 minutes, operators have ample 
time to both monitor and perform more that one service at a time.  Our assumption 
regarding the knowledge embedded in the IT systems is that the IT embedded knowledge 
will remain the same.   
However, as future IT systems are implemented, which require less operator 
knowledge, it is highly probable there will be a further merging of processes.  The “To-
Be” KVA spreadsheet represents the relative comparison between the ROK for the “AS-
IS” and the “To-Be” processes.  A relative comparison between the two yields a 30 
percent operator manning reduction which increases ROK from 205.11% to 301.97%.  In 
addition, the ROI increased from 105.11% to 201.97%.  The “To-Be” process yields a 
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Total K = 251,137,555, ROK = 301.97% and ROI = 201.97%.  The denominator for the 
“To-Be” process (Cost per day) also decreased from $3,473 to $2,361, which is a 
significant savings.   
 
 
Figure 12.   “To-Be” process flowchart. 
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Figure 13.   “To-Be” KVA Spreadsheet with graphs generated in Radial Viewer 
H. THE PROPOSED “RADICAL” SOLUTION 
The “Radical” prototype was an attempt to aggressively pursue the intent of the 
“To-Be” mandatory 30 percent reduction in operator manning.  This prototype is a 
recommendation and is neither tested, nor fully functional.  As with the “To-Be” 
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prototype, the “Radical” prototype is strictly a tool for analyzing the impact of making 
further manpower reductions, while maintaining the same performance demonstrated in 
the “AS-IS” process.  The “Radical” process demonstrates the impact of implementing a 
68% reduction in operators and a 100% reduction in web administrators as depicted in 
Figures 14 and 15.  Total manning reduction reduces manning from 85 personnel to 32, 
which translates to a 62% reduction in manning.  The assumptions, which were made 
when designing the “Radical” prototype are as follows:   
• The purpose of the prototype is an attempt to maximize the intent of the 
mandatory 30% reduction in operator manning, which will basically 
determine the minimal manning required for a CENTRIXS node. 
• Each CENTRIXS node will continue to average 25 terminals per 
installation regardless of how the network is manned. 
• Operators receive an additional 30 days of training (36 days total) in order 
to teach them multi-tasking and how to efficiently monitor more than one 
terminal. 
• Operator manning is reduced from 75 personnel to 24, with eight operators 
each manning three terminals through the use of A/B/C Switches and 
some additional training. 
• Operators still work an eight hour shift, while maintainers and system 
administrators work 12 hour shifts. 
• The role of web administrators was severely under utilized, and therefore 
system administrators will absorb the duties and responsibilities of the 
web administrators. 
• Market comparables and embedded IT were calculated in the same manner 
as the “To-Be” process and are described under the “To-Be” proposed 
solution. 
The “Radical” process yielded a Total K = 281,126,494, ROK = 586.01% and 








Figure 15.   “Radical” KVA Spreadsheet 
I. CONCLUSION 
The CENTRIXS system will soon reach the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) 
and will become an official Program of Record.  Therefore, as the technology becomes 
more mature and prevalent, Information Technology managers will need to understand 
the CENTRIXS architecture and how to communicate efficiently and effectively with our 
coalition partners.  Hopefully, this thesis will be a stimulus to look closer at how we are 
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manning CENTRIXS nodes and the associated terminals.  One key assumption with this 
portion of our thesis is that the complexity of all sub-processes is equal, and therefore the 
percentage of training time is proportional across all seven sub-processes.  The “AS-IS”, 
“To-Be”, and “Radical” process flowcharts, as well as the KVA spreadsheets clearly 
show that we can reduce total cost per day, while also increasing Total Return, Return on 
Knowledge, and Return on Investment.  
The operators are an important part of the process and generate the bulk of the 
daily services provided by CENTRIXS.  Therefore, operators, if given the opportunity, 
have the ability to make useful recommendations for changes and improvements in the 
process.  One way operators can contribute would be through creating a forum or 
Community of Interest (COI), where operators could express their concerns and make 
recommendations.  Working groups and training teams would also be valid methods of 
collecting and analyzing recommendations for improvement.  These working groups 
could be established based on role, which would enable operators, maintainers, and 
administrators to collaborate on ways to improve the process.  
Another recommendation is to include the requisite CENTRIXS training in the 
core training pipeline for enlisted personnel (ET/IT/IS/OS) who fill the required roles.  
Since virtually all platforms will eventually have CENTRIXS nodes, it makes sense to 
include the apprentice or “A” School level of training.  Bringing CENTRIXS to the 
school house vice mobile training teams would create the opportunity to develop the 
active duty CENTRIXS instructors into resident experts on the system.   
Even though all ships do not yet have CENTRIXS installed on a permanent basis, 
ships are equipped with CENTRIXS when they deploy.  Therefore, as CENTRIXS 
becomes ubiquitous, it is critical the Navy increase the baseline knowledge level 
throughout the fleet.  Currently, many actors are functional after the training, but not fully 
aware of all the resources available at their finger tips.  One in particular, is the use of 
Microsoft® Active Directory, vice using the Global Address List (GAL) to verify 
existing accounts.  The majority of CENTRIXS operators are unaware of how to map 
their local computer using Active Directory in order to view exactly which accounts are 
being utilized.  Instead, operators use email profile information from the GAL.  It is 
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understood that the actors want to manage properly, but they do not know how to manage 
because they have not been properly trained.  This could easily be resolved through 
something as simple as a web-based curriculum, which would focus on how to use the 
currently available tools as well as best practices.  Education and training in this area is 
critical, and if not pursued will continue to have a negative impact on CENTRIXS 
operations.  Future initiatives could also include incorporation of courses on Navy 
Knowledge Online (NKO) or the schoolhouse at the “A” and “C” school level. 
Lastly, the other recommendation made in the “Radical” process, which should be 
considered and researched, is making the system push vice pull.  Operators would then be 
able to spend more time managing information vice seeking it.  In addition, 
improvements in technology will eventually merge more and more existing technology 
and systems enabling us to do more with less.  However, until those technologies are 
fielded and tested, we need to resist the urge to reduce our manning before the technology 
matures.  By determining the current “AS-IS”, “To-Be”, and “Radical” processes as well 
as using KVA, we were able to measure the knowledge in each of the sub-processes.  
This thesis will assist future CENTRIXS managers with identifying which roles and sub-
processes are not providing value to the overall process so they can make logical 
decisions and recommends.  The following pages are diagrams designed to paint a picture 
of connectivity and organization of CENTRIXS networks.  Appendix F includes an 
Operational Activity Model overview, which is used to clearly delineate lines of 
responsibility, uncover unnecessary operational activity redundancy, make decisions 
about streamlining, combining, or omitting activities, and define or flag issues, 
opportunities, or operational activities and their interfaces (information flows among the 
activities) that need to be scrutinized further.  The Operational Activity Model 
graphically illustrates the “how” (operational activities) and “what” (Information 
Exchanges) data elements of a given architecture at the owner’s level of detail. 
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IV. ACQUISITION, INSTALLATION, AND ACCREDITATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (IADT&L) Life 
Cycle Management Framework is comprised of three major Decision Support Systems 
(DSS).  The first DSS, the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) is the management 
process by which the Department of Defense (DoD) provides effective, affordable, and 
timely systems to the users (DoDD 5000.1 and DoDI 5000.2).  DAS is the Acquisition 
Management piece and exists to manage the Nation’s investments in technologies, 
programs, and product support necessary to achieve the National Security Strategy and 
support the U.S. Armed Forces.  The second DSS, the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS) is the Capabilities Development piece.  JCIDS establishes 
procedures for supporting both the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the 
JROC in identifying, assessing, and prioritizing joint military capability needs (CJCSI 
3170.01E).  JCIDS implements a capabilities-based approach which effectively leverages 
the expertise of all government agencies, industry, and academia to identify 
improvements to existing capabilities and to develop new war-fighting capabilities. The 
third DSS, the Planning, Programming, Budget, and Execution (PPBE), is the resource 
allocation process and is controlled by the Secretary of Defense (DoD 7045.14 / MID-
913).  The PPBE DSS is used to establish, maintain, and revise the Future Years Defense 
Plan and to execute the DoD budget. This approach requires a collaborative process, 
which uses joint concepts and integrated architectures to identify prioritized capability 
gaps and synchronize Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material (Technology), 
Leadership and Education, Personnel (Culture) and Facilities (DOTMLPF) in order to 
resolve those gaps. 
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Figure 16.   DoD Decision Support Systems (DSS) (From: Cochrane, 5, 2004) 
The acquisition process is structured into discrete phases, which are separated by 
milestones or major decision points.  These milestones in conjunction with key activities 
enable comprehensive management of the process and provide informed decision 
making.  The acquisition process begins with identifying a capability need, which 
requires a material solution.  There are five categories of policies and principles that 
govern the DAS, which are discussed in detail in DoD 5000.1:1 and illustrated in Figure 
17.  The typical approach is for the DoD components is to first try to meet new capability 
needs through non-material solutions.  However, if existing systems or on-hand material 
cannot be used or modified in an economic manner then a material solution is sought out.  
Each defense acquisition program is assigned a Program Manager (PM) who is 




Figure 17.   Defense Acquisition Management Framework, Milestones, and JCIDS 
relationship (From: Cochrane, 3, 2005) 
The PM bears sole accountability and responsibility for accomplishing the 
objectives for Total Life Cycle Systems Management, which also includes sustainment 
and even disposal of the system.  The PM is responsible for the entire system from design 
to disposal (cradle to grave) and the PM credo is to stay on Schedule, under Cost while 
meeting or exceeding Performance specifications (Schedule, Cost and Performance). 
JCIDS replaced the Requirements Generation System (RGS) in 2003 and the new 
JCIDS system requires several key documents be sequentially completed which support 
the milestones decisions.  JCIDS Analysis begins with a Functional Area Analysis (FAA) 
to identify operational tasks, conditions and standards to achieve the program objectives.  
A Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) is then performed to determine capability gaps and 
if existing and programs which are already scheduled will be able to cover the gap in 
capability.  Then a Functional Solution Analysis (FSA) explores the possibility of an 
integrated DOTMLPF solution and finally a Post Independent Analysis (PIA) is 
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conducted which is an independent analysis, to determine the best fit.  The end result of 
the completion of these steps is the Initial Capability Document (ICD) (CJCSI 3170.01F, 
1-5, 2007.) 
The ICD is the first of four documents, which provide inputs to the Knowledge 
Management Decision Support (DS) Tool.  The ICD supports the JCIDS analysis concept 
decision and Milestone A and accomplishes this by describing why a material approach is 
needed to solve a capability gap.  The ICD summarizes the analysis of the DOTMLPF 
process and documents why other non-material solutions are inadequate to fulfill the gap 
in capability.  The second document, the Capability Development Document (CDD) 
supports program initiation at Milestone B by describing the evolutionary acquisition 
strategy, which will be used for the program.  The acquisition strategy depends on how 
well the requirements are known, the technical maturity, complexity as well as many 
other factors.  The CDD also describes and outlines the acceptable technical maturity, 
CMM as well as program logistics.  The third document, the CPD supports Milestone C 
and addresses the production considerations for a single increment of a program.  The 
fourth document, the Capstone Requirements Document (CRD) provides a common 
framework for further developing the CDDs and CPDs.  CRDs will eventually be 
replaced by the joint war fighting functional capability Integrated Architectures.  The 
ICD, CDD and CPD all feed the Knowledge Management (KM) DS tool (KMDS), which 
serves as a virtual library for review, approval and reference (DAU Press, 10, 2005.) 
The KMDS repository feeds the JPD decision, which then branches into three 
different process flows depending on the significance of the program to joint war 
fighting.  For ACAT I/IA/II programs where capabilities have significant impact on Joint 
War fighting there is JROC interest and review before the J2, J-4, J-6 review.  For ACAT 
I/IA/II programs without significant joint war fighting impact there is Joint Integration 
before the J-2, J-4, J-6 review.  For all other programs there is independent interest are 
reviews before the sponsor validates or approves the program.  Both the JROC and Joint 
Integration provide input to the J-2, J-4 and J-6 for review before the Functional 
Capability Board (FCB) review.  The FCBs act as action agents in order to lead the 
review of Service proposed functional needs analysis to ensure compliance with the 
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series of JCIDS documents and to make recommendations to both the Joint Capabilities 
Board (JCB) and the JROC.  Independent reviews provide inputs to the sponsor for 
validation and approval before it is submitted to the JCB and JROC for validation and 
approval (Cochrane, 28, 2005.)  A graphic of the detailed JCIDS Data Flow is illustrated 
in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18.   Detailed JCIDS Data Flow (From: Cochrane, 45, 2005) 
The Network Centric FCB (NC FCB) is responsible for the organization, analysis, 
and prioritization of joint war fighting capabilities and has four primary responsibilities: 
The first function is to oversee a portfolio of network centric capabilities within JCIDS, 
DAS and PPBE.  The second function is to lead in the development of network centric-
related concepts, operational views of integrated architectures, as well as related studies 
to use the portfolio of network centric products as a framework for performing network 
centric capability analyses in support of JCIDS.  The third responsibility of the NC FCB 
is to ensure horizontal integration of the network centric products across the other NC 
FCB functional areas. The fourth and final responsibility is to ensure both vertical and 
horizontal integration of communications capabilities across national, strategic, 
operational and tactical levels. The NC FCB also oversees the development and 
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maintenance of network centric-related functional and integrating concepts and integrated 
architectures for JROC approval.  Further, the NC FCB ensures the network-centric 
product lines include capabilities, attributes, measures and metrics.  The NC FCB also 
coordinates both the integration and de-conflicts capability proposals relating to network-
centric operations (CJCSI 3170.01F, 4, 2007.) 
The Military Communications-Electronic Board (MCEB) addresses military 
communications-electronics issues referred by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), 
CJCS, DoD CIO, Military Departments (MILDEPs) as well as the heads of other DoD 
Components. The Joint Staff/J-6 is the Chairman of the MCEB and board membership is 
composed of representatives from each Service, U.S. Coast Guard, DISA, Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA), NSA, and the Vice-Director of J-6, who represents the 
COCOMs.  The Assistant Secretary of Defense (NII) is the only non-chartered member 
invited to attend the executive session. The MCEB is the senior resolution, coordination, 
and prioritization body for matters related to NSS communications and interoperability 
testing issues within the war fighting enterprise mission area. The MCEB Chairman is 
mandated to inform the DoD CIO of all MCEB related matters, which may impact the 
DoD CIO responsibilities (MCBE, 27, 2002.) 
The Joint Battle Management C2 (JBMC2) Board of Directors (JBMC2 BOD) 
was established by the USJFCOM under Management Initiative Decision 912 (MID 912)  
which was designed to strengthen the DoD ability to organize, train, and equip joint 
forces and to provide “system-of-systems” capabilities to the joint force. The JBMC2 
BOD consists of G/FO or Senior Executive Service members from COCOMs, Services, 
and the Joint Staff (represented by a G/FO from J-6.)  Optional advisory members consist 
of representatives from ASD (NII), OSD (AT&L), USD (I), Service and/or agency 
program sponsors and/or executive agents, and selected Defense agencies and the U.S. 
Coast Guard.  The interface between the JBMC2 BOD and the JROC will occur via the 
JCIDS process (CJCSI 3170.01E.)  When required, the JBMC2 BOD provides enter level 
recommendations to the JROC via the JCIDS process (i.e., Gatekeeper, JCB, or JROC.)  
The JROC ensures USJFCOM’s JBMC2 mission, capability area requirements, and 
system-of-systems capability requirements are synchronized with other mission areas. 
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The JROC will also ensure Service and agency JBMC2 efforts are aligned, integrated, 
and coordinated with the USJFCOM integrated architectures and requirements (JCS, 88, 
2006.) 
There is also a requirement to both tightly link and manage defense department 
software components as part of the overall systems engineering process.  There are 
numerous software specific considerations and specifications which must be adhered to 
within the DoD.  Two DoD standards for software specifications are DoD Standard Data 
(DoD 8320.1) and DoD Net-Centric Data Strategy.  Additionally the IA considerations 
and specifications are covered by the DoD IT Security Certification and Accreditation 
Process (DITSCAP) throughout a programs life cycle.  For IT systems programs the 
details of the enterprise and domain architecture are instrumental to ensuring the 
programs are scalable and interoperable.  FORCENET serves as the overall enterprise 
architecture for CENTRIXS-M and the DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF) requires 
that specific operational, systems and technical views be produced during the programs 
life cycle.  The Clinger-Cohen Act (CCA) also applies to all federal IT and National 
Security Systems (NSS) acquisitions.  The DAU 5000 series processes are inherently 
CCA compliant and formal certifications by milestones are required.  Further, in 
accordance with (IAW) Public Law 108-87 all programs are required to provide formal 
compliance notification to Congress and PMs are required to report key parameters for 
their programs online using the DoD IT Registry (Cochrane, 23, 2003.) 
The IDATL process includes three technical management plans with the Systems 
Engineering Plan (SEP) being the only mandatory plan required for each milestone.  The 
Integrated Master Plan (IMP) is an optional even driven plan used to manage a programs 
major tasks and activities.  The Integrated Master Schedule (IMS) is also optional and 
often integrated with the IMP to display how work efforts relate to tasks and activities.  
The command structure is also important to the program and needs to support the IDATL 
process (IDATL, 6, 2005.) 
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Figure 19.   FORCENET and CENTRIXS Enterprise (From: Fetter, 36, 2006) 
B. CENTRIXS ACQUISITION 
In November 1999, Senior Defense Leadership formed the Interoperability Senior 
Steering Group (ISSG) as one of the Defense Intelligence Agency’s (DIA) four focus 
areas.  Leadership appointed U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) as the lead for the 
ISSG’s efforts that included developing a similar CENTRIXS system.  USCENTCOM 
Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) 1999-2003 established the requirement for a MNIS.  In 
response, the USCENTCOM Cooperative Defense Initiative (CDI) Campaign Plan 00-01 
and the USCENTCOM Coalition C4I Interoperability Plan March 2001, further defined 
the goal coalition network as providing “an integrated, interoperable, multidiscipline 
C4I/Shared Early Warning (SEW) System-of-Systems (SoS)” for U.S. and Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) nations, plus Egypt and Jordan (GCC+2) decisions makers. 
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The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, motivated USCENTCOM to pursue 
OEF and efforts focused on rapidly developing and implementing a network intelligence 
interoperability solution to support warfighting operations.  Overarching requirements 
included:  CIP and COP sharing ISR and Coalition operations (Boardman, 24, 2004.) 
With CENTRIXS firmly established as the DoD MNIS portion of the GIG, the 
Navy established CENTRIXS-Maritime (CENTRIXS-M) in 2004 as the maritime variant 
of CENTRIXS.  CENTRIXS-M. CENTRIXS-M was initially fielded as a project in 2002 
under the Coalition Wide Area Network (COWAN) which was funded under the Defense 
Emergency Response Fund (DERF), Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Fleet 
Operations and Maintenance (OMN).  CENTRIXS-M absorbed COWAN-Lite in FY04 
in order to create a single coherent Navy project and gained formal re-sourcing by 
OPNAV N6 in FY06.  PMW-160 has established an Accelerated Acquisition Plan (AAP) 
for the sustainment of legacy CENTRIXS-M Block 0 I and II systems.  
The capability of CENTRIXS-M to share data and information with coalition and 
allied forces both enhances and extends the GIG to the afloat war fighters.  CENTRIXS-
M aligns with FORCENET objectives of improved combat capability and knowledge-
based combat operations, which increase, force survivability (Soriano, 2007.) 
C. CENTRIXS STATUS 
PMW-160 is the acquisition manager for the CENTRIXS shore NOC and 
shipboard system environments for the Navy.  CENTRIXS Block II, Increment I (BLK 
II/I) became a PMW-160 POR in the first quarter of FY06 and is planned for Milestone C 
review by the MDA and Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) in the second Quarter of 
FY08.  PWM-160 submitted the CPD to OPNAV in July 2006 for entry to the JCID 
process.  CENTRIXS-M BLK II/I is scheduled for the third quarter Milestone C is 
planned for FY08 and the IOC is planned for the second quarter of FY09 will reach Full 
Operational Capability (FOC) in FY16.  CENTRIXS BLK II/I uses Trusted Sun Solaris 
8.x for combining multiple coalition enclaves and distributing data to Multi-Level Thin 
Client (MLTC) devices resulting in decreased hardware/footprint by no longer requiring 
separate clients and back end servers for each enclave.  The next generation, 
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CENTRIXS-M Block 2, Increment II, will provide a single Ultra Thin Client (UTC) 
workstation which will use virtualized domains to support multiple coalition COIs.   
CENTRIXS program is projected to receive Acquisition Category (ACAT III) 
designation.  The criteria for DoD ACAT III designation states the program does not 
meet criteria for ACAT II or above and less than a MAIS program and the decision 
authority is designated by the DoD CAE at the lowest level appropriate.  In addition, the 
SECNAV ACAT criteria for IT systems programs, is the program does not meet the 
criteria for ACAT II or above, program costs/year = $15 million = $32 million in FY 
2000 constant dollars or total program costs = $30 million = $126 million in FY 2000 
constant dollars or total life-cycle costs = $378 million in FY 2000 constant dollars.  The 
ACAT III Decision Authority is the Cognizant PEO, SYSCOM Commander, DRPM, or 
designated flag officer or senior executive service (SES) official, ASN (RD&A), or 
designee, for programs not assigned to a PEO, SYSCOM, or DRPM (SECNAVINST 
5000.2C, 2004) 
The CENTRIXS Resource Sponsor is OPNAV N6F3, the Requirements Officer is 
OPNAV N6F311, the PM is PEO C4I (PMW-160), the Deputy Program Manager is 
PMW-160A, the Afloat Networks Division Head is PMW-160.1, and the CENTRIXS 
Assistant Program Manager is PMW-160.13 (Soriano, 2007).  The Navy is scheduled to 
turn over the program to DISA in FY08.  The CENTRIXS CPD, Version 2.0, was 
prepared on October 17, 2006 in order to support the MDA’s decisions regarding 
Milestone C for CENTRIXS Increment 1.  The CENTRIXS program has been designated 
a JROC Interest/Joint Integration/Independent program.  The CENTRIXS Block 2, 
Increment I design provides simultaneous access to multiple enclaves using MLTC 
architecture in order to reduce the Space, Weight and Power (SWaP) requirements aboard 
Unit and Force Level platforms (Soriano, 2007.) 
The CENTRIXS design complies with OSA and DISR guidance for flexibility 
and interoperability.  CENTRIXS uses both COTS and GOTS and is primarily a Non-
Developmental Item (NDI).  CENTRIXS capabilities are developed and provided 
incrementally with increasing capabilities being implemented as new and improved 
COTS/GOTS products become available.  Key components within the CENTRIXS 
 67
architecture are on a 3-year software and 4-year hardware technical refresh cycle, and 
may be updated prior to the release of a following, next generation increments.  
The plan is to continue incorporating the CDS capabilities in the CENTRIXS 
program and to support the transition to the future MNIS program.  CENTRIXS BLK II/I 
design builds on the capabilities of the previous variants, as a "technology bridge" to start 
incorporating CDS capabilities.  Each CENTRIXS increment will have a separate CPD 
detailing the incorporation of new requirements.  Earlier versions of CENTRIXS, 
identified as Blocks 0, I and II, were fielded under the original CENTRIXS program.  
CENTRIXS is a COTS/GOTS, largely NDI program.  CENTRIXS capabilities are 
developed and provided incrementally with increasing capabilities being implemented as 
new and improved COTS/GOTS products become available.  Key components within the 
CENTRIXS architecture are on a 3-year software and 4-year hardware technical refresh 
cycle, and may be updated through ‘product replacement’ prior to the release of a new 
increment.  Through spiral development, successive increments will, such as 
CENTRIXS-M BLK II Increment II (BLK II/II), will incorporate new equipment, 
interfaces, and additional CDS capabilities, which will expand on the capabilities of the 
CENTRIXS nodes (SPAWAR, 17, 2007).  Refer to Figure 20 and Table 5 for a graphic 
depiction of the above discussion. 
FY06 FY07 FY08 FY10FY09 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18




Figure 20.   CENTRIXS-M BLK II/I development schedule (From: Soriano, 2007) 
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Table 5.   CENTRIXS BLK II/I and BLK II/II development schedule 
 
Schedule FY Profile FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY2009 
Milestone C –  Block II/I   2Q  
Initial Operational 
Capability 
  4Q  
Full Rate Production    2Q 
System Development –   
Block II/II 
1Q-4Q 1Q-4Q 1Q-4Q 1Q 
Operational Assessment  4Q   
Development/Operational 
Tests 
   1Q 
 
CENTRIXS is an interim legacy system being fielded to meet a serious need until 
a Joint replacement such as a MNIS or a Coalition Information Sharing (CIS) system can 
be developed and fielded.  CENTRIXS is related to CENTRIXS Global in that they share 
applications, are IP-based systems and use the GIG for communications.  CENTRIXS 
Global and CENTRIXS do not have approved ICDs.  The approved CENTRIXS Global 
Information Support Plan (ISP) does not identify CENTRIXS Global as either a Family 
of Systems (FoS) or Systems of Systems (SoS).  The CENTRIXS system meets the 
definitions of an IT system.  The CENTRIXS program will only include the acquisition 
of the hardware and software required to perform the capabilities identified in this CPD.  
The CENTRIXS system will be required to interface with, but not acquire existing and 
new domains and networks (SPAWAR CPD, 9, 2006.) 
CENTRIXS is a mission essential information system and Quality of Service 
(QoS) requirements will be further identified and defined by the ISP.  Significant 
CENTRIXS capabilities have been fielded to date with the Block 0, 1 and 2 builds.  The 
Increment 1 build is intended to consolidate and coordinate the execution of U.S. and 
Multinational CENTRIXS system capabilities.  The Increment I capability will be 
achieved by upgrades to specific systems, replacement of legacy systems, and 
introduction of new systems.  The NSS and IT supportability requirements will be 
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identified in both the program ISP and Acquisition Strategy (AS.)  The CENTRIXS 
system program will provide the NSS and ITS support for all Increment I systems. 
CENTRIXS is quickly becoming the center piece for coalition communications.  
Therefore, the timely acquisition, installation, accreditation as well as Life Cycle Support 
(LCS) of CENTRIXS are crucial to the success of the program.  The PM, PMW-160, is 
working hard to achieve full POR status for CENTRIXS.  Hardware for procurement and 
development of ISNS is under the cognizance of PEO C4I/Space PMW-160 as well as 
OPNAV (N71).  The Assistant PM for CENTRIXS is the Program Executive Officer, 
C4I in San Diego, California.  The Assistant Program Manager is responsible for the 
development, fielding, and life cycle support of the Navy’s CENTRIXS system (JCS, 2, 
2006.) 
Version 2.0 of the CPD, the first JCIDs document produced for CENTRIXS BLK 
II/I adds increased capability to an already mature system and will enter the acquisition 
process post Milestone B.  Since the BLK II/I revision will occur after Milestone B, there 
is no associated ICD, CDD, or Design Readiness Review (DRR) associated with the 
revised CPD.  CENTRIXS BLK II/I capabilities were derived from requirements outlined 
two primary documents, the joint GIG Mission Area ICD and the MNIS ICD.  The 
CENTRIXS program is approaching a Milestone C decision by the MDA and the PM is 
preparing the CPD prior to JROC review (Soriano, 24, 2007.) 
CENTRIXS Block 2, Increment I installation consists of two afloat variants, one 
for unit level platforms and one for force level platforms.  The unit level platforms have 
more restrictive SWaP requirements and therefore require a smaller CENTRIXS system 
footprint.  In order to reduce SWaP, the CENTRIXS hardware suite aboard unit level 
platforms consists of a single rack version of the hardware suite aboard force level 
platforms.  The reduction in hardware amounts to a reduction in the number of enclaves 
that a user can access simultaneously.  Unit level platforms will only be able to access 4 
enclaves vice the 5 enclaves for force level platforms. 
CENTRIXS Increment 1 also contains a shore variant, which will reside at the 
PRNOC and the UARNOC.  The shore variant, a component of CENTRIXS, provides the 
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afloat platforms with the ability to exchange information and monitor network 
performance and connectivity with allied and coalition partners, by providing access to 
Coalition Networks, as well as CENTRIXS Global via (mail guards, cross-domain chat 
server, and air-gapping workstations).  The CENTRIXS BLK II/I, shore variant is similar 
to the afloat system but contains additional equipment such as concentrators and has 
more servers.  Both shore facilities, PRNOC and UARNOC, maintain a fully redundant 
back-up capability.  Eventually, afloat units will be able to connect into any of the 
Regional NOCs and receive the same services being provided by the initial two shore 
facilities.  The shore NOCs also act as the main interface to the DISA Global CENTRIXS 
Wide Area Network.  The shore NOCs also have the capability to build various 
CENTRIXS COIs on an as required basis in order to support real world events and 
exercises. 
An estimated 113 systems (111 afloat and 2 ashore) will be required to satisfy 
operation requirements for afloat platform installations.  These numbers will change as 
warfare sponsors change deployment, commissioning, and decommissioning schedules.  
The ship quantities are current goals only and are subject to change.  Changes in the 
quantity of ships will not require a change in this CPD.  In addition, objective drop 
quantities will change as the systems and fleet requirements evolve. CENTRIXS 
Increment 1 will be provided to the following ship classes and shore sites as depicted in 
Table 6 (Soriano, 12, 2007). 
Table 6.   CENTRIXS-M BLK II/I Installation Plan by Platform 
Platform CENTRIXS-M 
Variant 
Number of Clients Quantities 
Aircraft Carrier - Nuclear (CVN) Force Level 30 8 
Amphibious Assault (LHA) Force Level 30 2 
Amphibious Assault (LHD) Force Level 30 6 
Amphibious Command (LCC) Force Level 30 2 
Amphibious (LPD) Unit Level 15 8 
Guided Missile Cruiser (CG) Unit Level 15 22 
Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG) Unit Level 15 63 
Network Operation Center 
(NOC) 
Shore Variant Variable 2 
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CENTRIXS shall be developed and acquired (in accordance with DoDI 5000.2) in 
increments providing increased functionality of CDS capabilities with succeeding 
increments.  The threshold target date for IOC attainment is the fourth quarter FY2009.  
The objective target date for IOC attainment is the second quarter FY2009.  IOC for each 
CENTRIXS increment is defined as the first attainment of a CENTRIXS system of 
approved specific characteristics that is operated by adequately trained Naval and civilian 
personnel.  FOC is attained for each increment when all units designated to receive the 
increment are fully equipped with the authorized system, as defined above, for IOC. 
Currently, the Pacific Region Network Operations Center (PRNOC) is the only 
network hub for all CENTRIXS connectivity.  CENTCOM has directed that all ships 
deploying to NAVCENT AOR have CENTRIXS capability.  At present, 153 Navy 
deployable warships have coalition connectivity.  This includes a separate shipboard 
coalition LAN/WAN with respective infrastructure, servers and work stations.  Under 
current procurement and installation funding, FOC for CENTRIXS is 2018.  These 
organizations work together to identify and implement the latest technologies, 
CENTRIXS BLK II/I in order to ensure proper implementation into the program.  
Engineering, development, integration, installation, training and life cycle support will be 
accomplished through Navy and Defense Department activities (Soriano, 2007.) 
CENTRIXS BLK II/I became a PMW-160 POR in first quarter of FY06 and is 
planned for Milestone C review and LRIP in FY2008.  The current CENTRIXS 
configuration uses Trusted Solaris 8.x for combining multiple coalition enclaves and 
distributing data to Multi-Level Thin Client devices resulting in decreased 
hardware/footprint by no longer requiring separate clients and back end servers for each 
enclave.  The CENTRIXS BLK II/II architecture is still under development and testing, 
and once operational, will provide a single hardware platform with virtualized domains to 
contain variable numbers of coalition COIs, which also provide separation of data in 
transit and at rest using Virtual Machine processing and encrypted hard disks. 
The Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC) is in the process of conducting a 
global Interoperability Certification on CENTRIXS.  The JITC will directly observe or 
simulate testing and utilize any available test data from Developmental and/or 
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Operational Tests conducted by any of the COCOMs or the Program Office.  Upon 
completion of testing, JITC will conduct a thorough analysis of all the test data gathered 
during the CENTRIXS Interoperability Test Phase.  An Interoperability Certification 
Evaluation Test Report will be provided to the DISA MNIS Joint Program Office (JPO) 
upon completion of the analysis.  An Interoperability Certification Letter will be drafted 
based on the outcome of the Interoperability test data and will be forwarded to the JITC 
Certification Panel for their review and approval (MIP, 2007.) 
The JITC maintains a CENTRIXS test network, which includes a command 
headquarters configuration and various deployable configurations.  We also maintain 
various NSA-approved type I encryptions devices, including the KG-175 TACLANE and 
KIV-7, and a data link simulator, which facilitates simulation testing of the live 
CENTRIXS network in a lab environment.  This test network is also used to test 
Information Assurance Vulnerability Alerts (IAVA) for the DISA MNIS JPO, prior to 
enterprise-wide deployment (JTCI, 2007.) 
D. INSTALLATION 
There are four operational CENTRIXS variants: Block 0, Block I, Block II and 
Block II/Increment I (BLK II/I) and Block II/Increment II (BLK II/II).  The BLK II/II is 
still under development and will therefore be mentioned only briefly.  As of May 2007 
there are 153 ships fielded with CENTRIXS capability, 129 Block 0, 20 Block I and 4 
Block II.  Over 130 installations were completed in FY2006, expanding the CENTRIXS-
M footprint from zero to nearly three fourths of all Navy platforms in a single calendar 
year.  The CENTRIXS program provides a network infrastructure that allows 
simultaneous access to multiple coalition WANs and incorporates the Common PC 
Operating System Environment (COMPOSE), which provides a server and client 
operating system environment for other applications and collaborative tools such as Same 
time Chat, Domino, and C2PC as means to share a COP and exchange information using 
Collaboration At Sea (CAS).  The CENTRIXS program uses both COTS hardware and 
software and Open Standards to maximize commercial technology and support.  In-
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service engineering and technical support ensures existing systems are upgraded and 
modified to keep pace with current technology and industry (PMW-160, 2, 2006.) 
In addition to the 153 platform installations scheduled for FY2006, there are also 
two different portable systems available.  The two portable variants are the CENTRIXS 
Fly-Away Kit (CFAK) or (FAK), which comes with a portable INMARSAT unit 
providing 24/7 connection at 64K and the CENTRIXS Portable Operation Kit (CPOK), 
which connects via an Iridium telephone at 2.4 Kilobits and are shown below in Figures 
21-23.  The CPOK is much more mobile but not as robust as the CFAK.  The CFAK or 
FAK is being deployed to Fleet Commanders on an as needed basis to support coalition 
communications requirements.  The CENTRIXS Inter-Service Engineering Activity 
(ISEA) has developed a Life Cycle Management plan to strategically oversea and support 
the FAK.  The FAK is being fielded to NECC (PMW-790) and follow on deliveries are 
scheduled for MOC, JMAST and Tactical Mobile (PMW-180) and the ISEA will 
providing training and sustainment for units being fielded. 
 
 
Figure 21.   CENTRIXS Fly Away Kit (CFAK) (From: Soriano, 24, 2007) 
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Figure 22.   CFAK Architecture (From: SPAWAR Master Series, 2007) 
 
 
Figure 23.   CPOK Architecture (From: SPAWAR Master Series, 2007) 
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The Standard CENTRIXS enclave build (Tables 7 and 8) represent the typical 
server, workstation and software installation. 
Table 7.   CENTRIXS Standard Enclave Server Build (From: Shannon, 2007) 
Servers Domain Controller -  Windows 2000/2003 Server; Active Directory; DNS; 
SAV Corporate Edition; MS Office 2003. 
 Exchange - Windows 2000/2003 Server; Exchange 2000; MS Office 2003.  
 DNSMAIL-  RedHat Linux 9.0; Sendmail.  
 NT/MGT -  Windows 2000/2003 Server; SAV Corporate Edition; Cisco 
TACACS; SolarWinds TFTP Server; SecureCRT 4.1; MS Office 2003; 
Whatsup Gold Server 9.0; SameTime Chat; NTP Server.  
 Domino - Windows 2000; Lotus Domino; and SameTime Chat Server. 
 Call Manager - Windows 2003; Cisco CallManager 4.1; MS SQL Server.  
 SUS - Windows 2000/2003; MS Systems Update; MS SQL Server; SAV 
Corporate Edition Server w/System Center Console and SecureCRT 4.1.  
Table 8.   CENTRIXS standard enclave workstation build (From: Shannon, 2007) 
Workstations WUG - Windows 2000/XP Pro; SAV Corporate Edition; SecureCRT 4.1; 
MS Office 2003. 
 Workstation - Windows 2000/XP Pro; SAV Corporate Edition; 
SecureCRT 4.1; MS Office 2003; SameTime Chat. 
1. Block 0  
The typical Block 0 or unit level installation nomenclature is AN/USQ-185(V1) 
and the installation consists of a three servers with removable hard drives, Primary 
Domain Controller (PDC) or (DC1), Backup Domain Controller (BDC) and a Dell D610 
Laptop Domino/Collaboration At Sea (CAS) Server.  Domain Controller One (DC1) is 
the PDC and configured with DNS, IIS Server, and the Sametime Chat Client.  Domain 
Controller Two (DC2) or the BDC is configured with DNS, MS Exchange and the 
Sametime Chat Client.  The configuration also includes a CISCO 2611XM Router, five 
port Hub, Alcatel 4024 Switch, KG-175 TACLANE, three DELL GX520 Workstations 
and a UPS.  Some Block 0 and Block I installation can include up to 10 workstations. 
The KG-175 TACLANE is then interfaced to the ADNS using a Cisco 3745 Router or 
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Proteon CNX-500 Router.  The ADNS is the further encrypted using a KG-194 
TRANSEC before the information leaves the ship.  The software load for the PDC, BDC, 
Lotus Domino Client and Workstation is GOTS-D4.1.1.2.  The CENTRIXS Block 0 
installation is designed for small unit level platforms, which have been designated as: 
AOE, ARS, AS, DD, DDG, CG, LPD, LSD, MCM, MHC and FFG (Soriano, 2007.) 
The nomenclature for the Preventive Maintenance System is AN/USQ-153B(V)6 
Block 0, which is different from the system nomenclature.  The PDC and BDC are 
typically installed in Radio Central and a laptop is loaded with the Lotus Domino Client, 
Collaboration At Sea (CAS), and maintained in Radio under lock and key.  The laptop is 
primarily for replication but is often loaded with the workstation software and used as 
another or backup workstation.  The PDC and BDC are also normally loaded with the 
workstation software so they can be used as both a server and a workstation.  Therefore, 
the Block 0 installation consists of three severs and three workstations providing access 
on three workstations to a single CENTRIXS enclave (MIP, 2007.) 
Table 9 outlines the prerequisite training and knowledge required by ships force 
personnel to maintain the system.  It is important to acknowledge the specific rate 
training the personnel have received as part of their core Class “A” and “C” school 
training as well as the training they receive as part of the CENTRIXS installation 
training.  The In-Service Engineering Activity (ISEA) will ensure training proficiency 
through Computer Based Training and Courseware, with Courseware being the long term 
solution.  The ISEA has acknowledged there is a training gap and that the unit level 
training needs to be addressed earlier in the schedule.  In addition, the ISEA has 
acknowledged a KM training shortfall, which needs to be, addressed (Soriano, AFCEA, 
2007.) 
 77
Table 9.   Prerequisite training and SPAWAR CENTRIXS-M installation training for 
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111 BLK II/I 
Clients 
JNC PREREQ 
 – 6 wks 
P/O ISNS SM  
-  2 wks 
Install OJT   
-  1 wk  
Module  
-  3 days 
Install OJT  
-  1 wk 
Class/lab  





Install OJT  
-  1 wk 
JQR/PQS   
-  4 hr  
ISM NEC 
 -  12 wks 
Install OJT  
-  1 wk 
JQR/PQS 
 - 4 hr  
JNC PREREQ  
-  6 wks 
Install OJT   
-  1 wk 
MTT REFTRA 
 - 1 wk 
Install OJT or 
MTT REFTRA 
 -  1 wk 
Class/lab  





6 Days 66 Days 48 Days 8 Days 128 Days 
Prerequisite A 
& C School 
0 Days 730 Days 365 Days 180 Days 1275 Days 
Training Per 
Person 
6 Days 796 Days 413 Days 188 days 1403 Days 
Total Training 
Days x number 
of personnel per 
Node 
6 Days 
X  3 
18 Days  
796 Days 
X  2  
1592 Days 
413 Days 
X  1 
413 Days 
188 Days 







The ship does not gain any additional personnel or billets for operating or 
maintaining the system as part of the installation.  The ship normally assigns Operation 
Specialists (OS) and Information System Technicians (IT) the responsibility of operating 
the system while Electronic Technicians (ET) normally maintaining the system.  Since 
the ship assigns operators and maintainers the enlisted ratings as well as pay grades 
assigned varies from ship to ship.  System Administrators responsibilities are typically 
assigned to ships force personnel who are already performing system administration 
duties and responsibilities for the ship.  However, web administrators are normally not 
required or assigned for unit level installations.  If the platform has embarked staff then 
the ships Web administrator is trained on configuring the CAS site.  SPAWAR is 
preparing a Naval Training Support Plan (NTSP), which has proven challenging since 
there are defined roles with different training paths.  The two training paths are the Fleet 
Installation Training (FIT) and Shore Installation Training (SIT) (Shannon, 2007.) 
SPAWAR has leveraged heavily off the existing ISNS training enlisted personnel 
receive and focuses on difference training.  SPAWAR is in the process of restructuring 
the prerequisite knowledge exams for enrollment in the training since overlooking the 
prerequisite requirements in the past has lowered the level of training for entire class.  
The system uses the standard COMPOSE software load which further enables SPAWAR 
to use difference training.  The average total cost for a CENTRIXS Block 0 installation is 
$1.5M, $500K for materials, $500K for installation and $500K for accreditation.  In 
addition, SPAWAR budgets $7,500 per installation for training ships force personnel on 
system operation and maintenance (MIP, 2007.) 
2. Block 1 
The typical Block 1 or force level installation nomenclature is AN/USQ-185A 
(V1) and the installation consists the installation consists of a three servers with 
removable hard drives, PDC or (DC1), BDC and a Dell D610 Laptop 
Domino/Collaboration At Sea Server.  Domain Controller One (DC1) is the PDC and 
configured with DNS, IIS Server, and the Same-time Chat Client.  Domain Controller 
Two (DC2) or the BDC is configured with DNS, MS Exchange, and the Same-time Chat 
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Client.  The configuration also includes a CISCO 2611XM Router, five port Hub, Alcatel 
4024 Switch, KG-175 TACLANE, three DELL GX520 Workstations and a UPS.  Some 
Block 0 and Block I installation can include up to 10 workstations.  The KG-175 
TACLANE is then interfaced to the ADNS using a Cisco 3745 Router or Proteon CNX-
500 Router. The ADNS is the further encrypted using a KG-194 TRANSEC.  The 
software load for the PDC, BDC, Lotus Domino Client and Workstation is GOTS-
D4.1.1.2.  The CENTRIXS Block 1 installation is designed for force level platforms, 
which have been designated as: CV/CVN, LHA, LHD, AGF and LCC (Soriano, 2007.) 
The nomenclature for the Preventive Maintenance System is AN/USQ-153B(V)6 
Block 1 which is different from the system nomenclature.  The PDC and BDC are 
typically installed in Radio Central and a laptop is loaded with the Lotus Domino Client, 
CAS, and maintained in Radio under lock and key.  The laptop is primarily for 
replication but is often loaded with the workstation software and used as another or 
backup workstation.  The PDC and BDC are also normally loaded with the workstation 
software so they can be used as both a server and a workstation.  Therefore, the Block 1 
installation consists of three severs and ten workstations, each server and workstation has 
three removable hard drives.  
 
Figure 24.   CENTRIXS Installations as of 23 May 2007 (From: Soriano, 8, 2007) 
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A CENTRIXS Block I system was installed upon the USS ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN (CVN) and the system included three workstations in Radio Central but the 
ship purchased an additional 15 workstations which were also configured with the 
workstation client software.  The COMPOSE software load was used to configure the 
DNS, EX, and WINS servers.  As with the CENTRIXS Block 0 installation the 
workstation software which contains Microsoft Office was loaded onto the servers so 
they could also function as workstations.  The average installation, accreditation and 
training cost for Block 1 installation is virtually identical to the average cost of a Block 0 
installation, a total cost of $1.5M (Shannon, 2007.) 
 
Figure 25.   CENTRIXS-M Block II Multi-Level Thin Client (MLTC) Dual Rack 
(From: Soriano, 10, 2007) 
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3. Block II  
The Block II installation is the new command ship installation and the 
nomenclature is the AN/USQ-185(V2).  The Block II installation incorporates the Multi-
level Thin Client (MLTC) architecture, which reduces SWaP.  The MLTC virtual 
workstation supports simultaneous access to four coalition enclaves and SIPRNET.  The 
Block II installation is designed for LCC and CV/CVN platforms and is comprised of a 
PDC, BDC and a Laptop Domino Server.  The configuration also includes a CISCO 
router, Omni-stack switch, KG-175 TACLANE, 30 Ultra-Thin client terminals and an 
UPS.  The software load for the PDC, BDC, Lotus Domino Client and Workstation is 
GOTS-D4.1.1.2. The COMPOSE load was used to configure the DNS, EX, and WINS 
servers.  The Block II version is scheduled to be accredited in FY09 using the Sun Solaris 
10 TX/CONET 2.0 software.  A total of 24 Force Level (FL) installations are scheduled 
and five installations will be completed in FY07.  The average installation, accreditation 
and training cost for Block I installation is virtually identical to the average cost of a 
Block 0 and a Block I installation which is $1.5M (Shannon, 2007.) 
 
Figure 26.   CENTRIXS Block II (MLTC) Demonstration (From: Soriano, 11, 2007) 
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4. Block II Increment I 
The Block II Increment I, BLK II/I, installation provides a network infrastructure, 
which enables simultaneous access to multiple Coalition WAN and incorporates the 
COMPOSE.  COMPOSE provides a server and client operating system environment for 
other applications and collaborative tools such as Same-time Chat, Domino and C2PC as 
means to share a COP and exchange information using CAS.  The CENTRIXS program 
uses both COTS hardware and software and Open Standards to maximize commercial 
technology and support.  In-service engineering and technical support ensures existing 
systems are upgraded and modified to keep pace with current technology and industry.  
The BLK II/I installation increases the number of Unit Level (UL) clients from 10 to 15 
UTC and uses a single rack configuration.   
 
Figure 27.   Ultra Thin Client (UTC) consists of a Monitor, Keyboard and Mouse 
(From: SPAWAR, 2003) 
The FL version increases the number of clients from 10 to 30 and uses a dual rack 
configuration similar to the Block II design.. Accreditation of the BLK II/I will require 
new hardware components and a new operating system (Sun V245 and Solaris 10 TX).  
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The installation schedule has 27 systems being fielded in FY09, 37 in FY10 and 36 in 
FY11. This upgrade is in support of GWOT operations.  Joint Worldwide Intelligence 
Communications System (JWICS) capability will be installed on CENTCOM AOR 
deployed submarines (Department of the Navy Publication, 2007). 
 
 
Figure 28.   CENTRIXS Block II/Increment I, FL Architecture (From: Soriano, 34, 
2007) 
5. Block II Increment II  
The future CENTRIXS BLK II/I installation will eventually provide a single 
hardware platform with virtualized domains to contain variable numbers of coalition 
COIs, which also provide separation of data in transit and separation of data at rest using 
Virtual Machines (processing) and encrypted hard disks.  The future CENTRIXS BLK 
II/II installations will produce solutions, which will leverage the Consolidated Afloat 
Network and Enterprise Services (CANES) capability.  Eventually CANES will be the 
single network provider and integrate all UNCLAS, Coalition to SCI.  CANES will 
reduce cost by eliminating existing standalone/legacy networks and will provide an 
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adaptable solution for meeting our rapidly changing warfighting requirements.  Further, 
CANES will reduce shipboard footprint, SWaP, and overall lifecycle management costs.   
The support for CANES is based on the requirement to reduce the number of 
networks, providing efficiency through a single engineering focus on technical solutions.  
CANES will streamline the acquisition, contracting, and testing events, and eliminate the 
inefficiencies associated with managing multiple Configuration Management (CM) 
baselines, logistics and training “tails” into a unified support structure.  See Figure 29 
below for a graphic of the road ahead.  CANES will be developed and deployed using a 
highly innovative and competitive business strategy guaranteeing best value to the 
government and best solution for the Sailor (Department of the Navy Publication, PEO 
C4I, 2006.) 
 
Figure 29.   CANES Roadmap (From: Dept. of the Navy PEO C4I, 2006) 
6. Network Operation Center (NOC) 
The two shore Network Operation Centers are the PRNOC and the Unified 
Atlantic Region Network Operations Center (UARNOC).  The CENTRIXS installation at 
UARNOC was completed third quarter FY07.  PRNOC and UARNOC support the fleet 
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by providing network monitoring and troubleshooting, help desk, DNS services, Mail 
services, Mail guard administration support.  The PRNOC CENTRIXS operations 
support consists of one NNWC Engineer, three CENTRIXS In-Service Engineering 
Activity (ISEA) Engineers, one Operations Manager, three Operations Group Leads, nine  
Network Operators (two to three watch standers per shift) and four CAS Web 
administrators (one watch stander per shift).  The CENTRIXS operations support hours 
are 0600-2300 seven days a week.  The PRNOC CENTRIXS applications consist of 
SMTP/POP Email, DII Mail Guard, VOIP, C2PC and CAS, which also includes 
Persistent Chat, Same-time Connect/Web Chat, Domino Web and Domino Email 
(Soriano, 2007.) 
The primary hidden cost drivers which impact the overall installation costs are the 
type and condition of the platform, location where the installation is being performed and 
the amount of reuse included in the installation.  The average cost of an operational Block 
0, Block I and Block II platform including the equipment, installation and accreditation is 
$1.5M.  There was insufficient unclassified data available to break down the cost by Unit 
Level and Force Level installations.  Further, there was insufficient information available 
to provide an estimate for the BLK II/I and BLK II/II installation costs (Soriano, 2007.)  
See Appendix H for typical PRNOC connectivity diagrams. 
E. ACCREDITATION 
System Accreditation is a challenge and is difficult to execute a under extended 
accreditation cycles.  Certification test and evaluation takes an average of 18 Months for 
medium priority systems.  Therefore, a reduction in the accreditation timeline is critical 
to fielding the system on schedule.  One potential solution is to use an as-is or 
incremental approach, modifying components which have already been accredited.  
Another challenge will be attaining Common Criteria Certification for security critical 
components prior to use in DoD acquisition or development.  Secret and Below 
Interoperability (SABI) Certification is another drawn out process, however, prior SABI 
Certifications on systems being upgraded will reduce the time required for accreditation.   
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Systems, which have already been fielded and are operational, will require 
accelerated re-accreditation.  Accelerated re-accreditation will be required for changing 
enclaves, adding new enclaves, modifying or adding to fielded applications and changes 
in security policy.  The existing security tool such as DITSCAP, which is now known as 
the DoD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP) and 
SABI-CDS provide the guidance required for commands to achieve full accreditation.  
The DIACAP instruction was placed into effect July 06, 2006 and a 180 day period was 
outlined to transition from DITSCAP to DIACAP (DIACAP, 2006.) 
SABI is an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, 
Communications and Intelligence (ASD/C31) mandated, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Command, 
Control, Communications and Computer Systems (JS/J6) sponsored Information 
Assurance initiative, which improves the security posture of all secret and below DoD 
systems because it utilizes a community-based risk acceptance approach, uses proven 
information systems engineering principles and encourages the reuse of proven 
information security solutions.  The goal of SABI is to ensure secure secret and below 
interoperability solutions for the war fighter within community-acceptable risks.  
CENTRIXS will have an open SABI ticket during the SABI certification process.  
Another version of SABI is Top Secret and Below Initiative (TSABI) is a critical 
component of the latest CENTRIX Block II accreditation process and is founded on 
Information System Security Engineering (ISSE) principles whereby information systems 
security (INFOSEC) is integrated as a part of systems engineering and systems 
acquisition processes, strong customer participation in support of mission needs, and the 
optimal use of INFOSEC disciplines to provide security solutions. Documentation 
implements the DoD Instruction 5200.40, DITSCAP.  The SABI process teams the local 
site customer with appropriate engineering, risk, vulnerability, training and programmatic 
community risk-focused support necessary to develop the right solution for the 
customer's SABI requirement. SABI maintains this community team throughout the 
system security engineering process.  This strengthens the community risk acceptability 
of a specific site solution through continued dialog and participation of all relevant 
stakeholders (SABI, 1998.) 
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The Director of Central Intelligence Directive 6/3 and the System Security 
Authorization Agreement (SSAA) are vital to achieving system accreditation.  The SSAA 
is a formal agreement between the Designated Approving Authority (DAA), the 
Certification Authority (CA), and User Representatives resulting in certification and 
accreditation approval. The SSAA is to be used throughout the lifecycle of the system to 
guide actions, document decisions, specify security requirements, and maintain 
operational security.  The SSAA is a living document that undergoes reviews to record 
any changes made which may affect the accreditation status of the system.  The SSAA 
verifies the system mission, environment, and architecture.  It identifies threats to the 
system and documents compliance with Certification and Accreditation (C&A) security 
requirements.  The SSAA evaluates the lifecycle and documents all constraints and 
vulnerabilities of the system.  The SSAA ensures the CA and DAA are aware of 
vulnerabilities within the system and allow for operation with an acceptable level of risk, 
culminating in the accreditation of the system.  Each installation must have a unique 
SSAA as part of the accreditation package (SABI, 1998.) 
The CENTRIXS program must remained aligned with existing DoD activities 
such as Unified Cross Domain Management Office (UCSMO) which maintains an 
inventory of all CDS, Navy Cyber Defense Operations Command (NCDOC), Joint Task 
Force-Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO) and MNIS, which all fall under the 
umbrella of DoD coalition networks.  Accreditation is the most difficult and time 
consuming component of a CENTRIXS installation.  
F. CHALLENGES 
The budget for the next three years appears to introduce a considerable challenge 
to the program with a drastic reduction in funding, over one sigma, in FY2008 and 
FY2009.  The FY2007 O&M budget of $268 million is followed by the planned budgets 
of $25.34M in FY2008 and $24.7M in FY2009.  Not to mention the recent $5.8M 
augmentation in FY2007 to increase the number of clients per installation.  With 153 
existing installations and only four CENTRIXS Block II installations completed as of the 
first quarter FY2007 it is unlikely the program will be able to field the scheduled 
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installations from FY2008 through FY2011.  The fielding schedule for the BLK II/I calls 
for 27 installations in FY2010, 37 for FY2010 and 36 for FY2011.  The aggressive 
fielding plan does not correspond to the drastic reduction in program funding.  See Figure 
29 for a graphic of Fleet Commanders Top 10 C4I priorities (FCW, 2007.) 
 
Figure 30.   Trident Warrior 2005, Fleet Commanders Top 10 C4I Priorities (From: 
Trident Warrior Lessons Learned, 2005) 
As the DoD continues to moves to toward more joint and coalition operations 
CENTRIXS is becoming even more critical since it provides the capability to operate 
with coalition forces at various levels of classification.  With the coalition demand 
increasing the CFAK is becoming popular choice for commanders to gain interoperability 
for short term exercises or operations.  However, the CFAK was designed as a emergency 
surge gap filler and the program is not designed to support long term commitments.  
Therefore, as more units are fielded on U.S. platforms there will be a reduction in the 
number of CFAK requests.  In turn we need our coalition partners to also commit to 
investing in installing the CENTRIXS systems on their ships to prevent a over 
dependence on the CFAK option.   
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The FY2008 budget request shifts responsibility for CENTRIXS from the Navy to 
DISA.  Changes in program responsibility typically cause an adverse impact the program 
schedule by creating a lag as the new personnel get up to speed.  However, this should 
not be the case with DISA since they have been involved with CENTRIXS and are 
familiar with the program and issues (Brewin, 1, 2006.) 
Maintaining the gap between program development and advances in technology 
appears to be the critical challenge for CENTRIXS.  Since IT systems take an average of 
10 years to field and with technology doubling every 18 months we continually field 
systems which miss the mark and are up to six generations behind the technology we 
need today.  CENTRIXS is not an exception to the trend of lagging fielding lagging 
technology but DoD is doing better than many other sectors at keeping up with the 
technology curve.   
G. CONCLUSION 
The CJCS identified our coalition communications during Trident Warrior 2006 
as, “Inadequate Ability to Share Operational Information with Mission Partners.”  The 
need to share information has been identified by seven of the nine combatant commands 
in their Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs).  The Department of Defense lacks an information 
sharing strategy to guide the transition from today’s information sharing paradigm to a 
net-centric paradigm.  Information sharing today occurs via interconnected physical 
networks separated by classification, whereas information sharing in a net-centric 
paradigm needs to be based upon classification and role-based access. Data strategy 
efforts enabling COIs, cross CDSs, and KM capabilities enabling secure information 
sharing with Joint, multinational, interagency, state, local and first responder mission 
partners are inadequate to mission needs (CJCS 6285.01, 2006.) 
CENTRIXS-M is not intended to be a Family of Systems (FoS) or Systems of 
Systems (SoS), but rather an interim solution to achieving coalition communications until 
such time as a FoS or SoS is identified.  However, CENTRIXS is the current DoD 
multinational (coalition, allied, bilateral and multinational) information sharing portion of 
the GIG.  With the CENTRIXS-M BLK II/I variant scheduled to reach Full Operational 
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Capability (FOC) in FY2018 we are still a long way from identifying an overarching SoS 
for coalition communications.  However, there are currently three operational 
Multinational Information Sharing (MNIS) systems including CENTRIXS.   
The second MNIS system, Griffin, is a framework to provide a permanent, multi-
nationally-developed, managed, and resourced capability that enables the exchange of 
information between the classified networks of participating nations at the SECRET 
level.  Griffin encompasses necessary infrastructure, connectivity, applications, services, 
management, and governance.  The reach of Griffin is dependent on the reach of each 
nation’s classified network to its lower levels of command.  All nations that participate 
on Griffin contribute, materially and in-kind, to the development, operation, and 
management of the capability.  The Griffin infrastructure is a network of guards allowing 
e-mail between national systems.  
The Combined Federated Battle Laboratory Network (CFBLNet) is a distributed 
Wide Area Network (WAN) used by the Combined Communications Electronics Board 
(CCEB) and NATO to conduct coalition communication experiments.  The CCEB is a 
five nation joint military communications-electronics organization whose mission is the 
coordination of any Communications-Electronics (C-E) matters referred by a member 
nation.  The CCEB member nations are Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom and the United States.  A similar organization, Multinational Interoperability 
Council (MIC) is an operator led forum, which identifies interoperability issues and 
articulates actions, which contribute to more effective coalition operations.  The member 
nations of the MIC are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom 
and the United States.  Although New Zealand and NATO Allied Command 
Transformation (ACT) are not members of the MIC they enjoy official observer status. 
Therefore, of the three MNIS program listed only CENTRIXS and Griffin are 
actually operational MNIS systems while direct support for testing is provided by the 
CFBLNET until broader Net-Centric Enterprises Services (NCES) and GIG compliant 
approach to MNIS is developed.  This interim process is established to match user 
requirements for operations and maintenance support of existing systems with 
programmed funding.  CENTRIXS, Griffin, and CFBLNET provide proven operational 
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and research, development, testing & evaluation (RDT&E) capabilities and services that 
must be sustained to support current and anticipated war fighter needs.  The MNIS 
current operational systems will continue to provide capabilities to combatant commands, 
Services, and agencies until the objective MNIS replaces or consolidates an operational 
capability equal to or greater than the capability provided by the current operational 
system.  The operations and sustainment support for MNIS current operational systems 
will evolve to a Services Based Sustainment (SBS) concept integrated into the Defense 
Information Systems (CJCSINST 6285.01, 2006.) 
New, increased capabilities designed to support valid information sharing 
requirements will be managed on a case-by-case urgency-of-need basis through the Joint 
Urgent Operational Need (JUON) process as an exception to policy.  During the interim 
period until the objective MNIS program is established, current operational system 
sustainment requirements are managed by this instruction.  As the DoD Executive Agent 
(EA) for MNIS formally establishes the objective MNIS program, DoD EA for MNIS 
will establish and manage the associated longer-term objective program requirements 
process.  Following the migration of current operational system capabilities to complete 
oversight by the DoD EA for MNIS and the DISA MNIS Joint Program Office (JPO), the 
DoD EA for MNIS will manage the process for all objective program requirements 
procedures.   
It is clear the future coalition communications requirement will continue to 
increase while we attempt to cover gaps in our capabilities.  The Joint Staff/J-6 will 
continue to gather international requirement considerations related to the CCEB, MIC, 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), North American Air Defense (NORAD) 
Command, and United Nations Command (UNC) partnerships participating in 
CENTRIXS, Griffin, and CFBLNET.  USEUCOM normally collects NATO 
requirements.  Allied nations, coalition partners, and other participating nations that are 
not formal members of CCEB, MIC, NATO, NORAD and UNC may submit 
requirements through combatant command sponsors to Joint Staff/J-6.  CENTRIXS is 
filling a critical capabilities gap in our C4I architecture, and will continue to be our 
primary means of coalition communications through FY2018. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY DISCUSSION 
The United States is an undisputed global leader and pioneer in developing 
Network Enabled Capabilities.  The Network Centric Warfare (NCW) program is at the 
heart of the U.S. transformation strategy, as defined in the Joint Vision 2020, and 
CENTRIXS is a capability that can make this transformation strategy a reality.  
According to Former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, our (U.S.) ability to 
leverage the power of information and networks will be key to our success."  By 2012, 
NCW should reach full capability, which will include a single network of sensors, 
deciders and shooters; IP addressable warriors, weapons and sensors; and commanders' 
shared awareness and knowledge. 
The GIG system in conjunction with CENTRIXS will be the largest information 
network in the world and the key element of U.S. network-centric capabilities.  Built 
based on commercial technologies, it will provide processing, storage, management, and 
transport of information to support all DoD, national security, and related intelligence 
community missions and functions.  GIG capabilities will be available from all operating 
locations: bases, posts, camps, stations, facilities, mobile platforms, and deployed sites.  
The GIG will interface with allied, coalition, and non-GIG systems.  Next-generation 
satellites will provide massive amounts of real-time information to platforms and weapon 
systems deployed on the tactical edge.  Every square meter of the globe will have its own 
IP address, thus enabling effective tracking of all actors on the battlefield.  The $34 
billion program should be completed by 2011 (DoD PEO C4I, 2006.)  Thanks to the GIG 
and CENTRIXS, deployed American soldiers will no longer be at the mercy of someone 
remote from the fight determining what information they need.  CENTRIXS is at the 
heart of coalition communications and will continue to develop as the need for ease of 
information sharing becomes more and more critical throughout the world. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Information sharing is an ongoing problem that continues to stifle effective and 
efficient military operations.  As seen in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other theaters, 
interagency and coalition partners all have a problem with information sharing.  Part of 
the problem stems from cross-domain solutions, which are being worked very hard.  The 
result is a so-called "sneaker net,” in which information is put into a computer that is then 
carried to those who need it.  Needless to say, this is not what should be expected out of 
the largest, most powerful, and most digitized military on earth.  Trust, not technology, is 
at the core of the problem.  Currently, CENTRIXS connects over thirty countries within 
Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, yet most information sharing agreements are 
bilateral, resulting in all sorts of communication breakdowns.  For example, information 
comes in sent by Romanian troops to U.S. officials who in turn want to share it with 
British commanders.  The problem is that cross-domain solutions keep popping up and 
have never been certified from an information assurance standpoint.  The reliability of the 
solution is ultimately unknown.  As a result, senior coalition members in Afghanistan and 
Iraq do not have access to DoD secret networks. 
To address the issue, a new identity-based, information assurance network is 
needed.  This network would let the software decide who gets what.  This solution would 
mimic a similar effort, DoD's Cross Domain Collaborative Information Environment, 
which is being managed by U.S. Joint Forces Command and recently completed the first 
phase of the National Security Agency's Certification Test and Evaluation process. 
Another problem is that currently CENTRIXS connectivity to GIG/DISN access 
and other U.S. classified resources is tremendously limited.  Information can be moved 
between the U.S. secret environment and the coalition environment through appropriate 
Content Filters (e.g., Radiant Mercury).  Currently, it is important to point out that these 
options for “reach-back” connectivity to the National Communication and Information 
System are available only to U.S. users of CENTRIXS networks.  Non-U.S. users 
currently access information resources through directly connected workstations or LANs, 
employing the information services provided by the particular CENTRIXS enclave(s) to 
 95
which they are connected.  It is also worth noting that some of the content-filtering/guard 
technologies, like Radiant Mercury12, are based on commercially unavailable operating 
systems.   
The releasability of these capabilities will influence the degree of connectivity 
between CENTRIXS and NATO/National systems, which will affect the richness of non-
U.S. contributions to CENTRIXS-based information exchange/sharing.  Realizations of 
Network-Centric Operations/Network-Enabled Capability in a coalition environment will 
depend on the elimination of “air-gapping” solutions to the question of information 
exchange/sharing.  Network-level and system-level interconnection of non-U.S. systems 
to CENTRIXS will be required, not just extension of the CENTRIXS component network 
VPNs into coalition partners facilities.  In the future, access via the national networks of 
coalition nations and access to the information systems and services on the national 
networks could be facilitated through a Regional Gateway, as defined under CENTRIXS.  
This architecture solution proposed for the CENTRIXS Regional Gateway closely 
resembles the NATO Information Exchange Gateway, NATO’s approach to information 
exchange/sharing between NATO, its Member Nations, and NATO-led Coalitions. 
As the CENTRIXS program manager for CENTRIXS-GCTF, the third author of 
this document has tested this solution with the cooperation of Sun Microsystems in the 
Afghanistan AOR.  Unfortunately, DISA releasability guidelines prohibit implementation 
of this initiative over the full family of CENTRIXS enclaves.  
As challenging as it was to build an infrastructure to support U.S. forces, an even 
more daunting task is the incorporation of the various coalition partners who arrive at a 
Combined-Joint Operation expecting to be fully incorporated into the CENTRIXS 
architecture.  From a political perspective, planners can count on the coalition partnership 
containing a new set of members for every operation for the next contingency.  Each of 
these members will have entirely different sets of communications equipment that will 
assuredly not be compatible with what is being prescribed as the CENTRIXS standard.  
The answer is to source additional funds to the CENTRIXS program manager to put into 
service a FAK that can be acquired by participating counties to connect to the 
CENTRIXS network where interface is required.  This FAK will be modular, adaptable, 
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scalable, secure end-to-end and built entirely from commercial off-the-shelf technologies.  
The FAK will be designed with the intent of increasing the CENTRIXS forward 
presence, connecting all participating countries, and extending the network to austere 
locations.  This initiative would alleviate the issue of countries with scarce resources not 
being able to fully participating in coalition efforts due to inadequate or incompatible 
equipment. 
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This diagram depicts U.S. and Coalition Strategic Interoperability and illustrates 
supporting commands and agencies at the operational level (USCENTCOM, 34, 2004.) 
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This diagram depicts the CENTRIXS High-Level Architecture, and illustrates the 
network connectivity installed on surface ships and at the Navy’s Regional Network 
Operations Centers (USCENTCOM, 45, 2004.) 
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This diagram illustrates the notional architecture for CENTRIXS shore unit connectivity. 
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This diagram illustrates the notional architecture for CENTRIXS afloat unit connectivity. 
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The CENTRIXS Utility Tree is a detailed listing of the functional requirements and key 
quality attributes of the CENTRIXS network. 
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APPENDIX F.  OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY MODEL OVERVIEW 
 
 
The Operational Activity Model graphically illustrates the “how” (operational activities) 
and “what” (Information Exchanges) data elements of a given architecture at the owner’s 




This diagram of the Operational Activity Model shows operators access one or 
more of the network services via network service requests.  After accessing any 
network service(s), operators may logout or access other services.  Operator 




This diagram of the Operational Activity Model represents the explicit IA 
functionality provided by the CENTRIXS.  IA functionality that exists as a 
support function implicit to other functionality is not included in this activity 
model (From: Ching, 2007.) 
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This diagram of the Operational Activity Model depicts the process flow for both 
system maintenance, and configuration requests annotating the impact of policy 





This diagram of the Operational Activity Model describes the sequencing of 
activities in the OV-5 model.  Events may also be referred to as inputs, 
transactions or triggers.  Timing of these events is not critical for any of the 
CENTRIXS functionality, because there are certain time requirements for 




This diagram of the Operational Activity Model shows that the security 
administrative operator may create, modify, or delete operator accounts.  The non-
system or security administrative operator logs into the network via a session 
login and then logs into an enclave to access network services.  Lacking 
administrative or security privileges, the operator may only access the network 
services.  The operator may return to access other services as often as desired 




This diagram of the Operational Activity Model is a System Interface Diagram, which 





This diagram of the Operational Activity Model provides a system communication 






This diagram of the Operational Activity Model shows the relationships between the 




This diagram of the Operational Activity Model shows the relationships between the 
Enterprise System Services (From: Ching, 2007.) 
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This diagram illustrates the way a typical PRNOC is set up for connectivity with a ship 




This diagram illustrates the way a typical PRNOC is set up for connectivity to a 
particular land site (From: Chang, 2007.) 
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APPENDIX H.  CENTRIXS NPS SURVEY DOCUMENTS 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Informed Consent Form 
 
Introduction.  You are invited to participate in a survey entitled CENTRIXS at NPS. 
 
Procedures.  This survey should take between 5 and 10 minutes to complete, and will be 
comprised of questions related to a CENTRIXS install here at NPS.  No personal 
information will be used other than to evaluate the benefits of installing a CENTRIXS node 
on campus.  Following the survey, you may be contacted personally based on your answers 
for further research. 
 
Risks and Benefits.  I understand that this survey does not involve greater than minimal 
risk and involves no known reasonably foreseeable risks or hazards greater than those 
encountered in everyday life.  I have also been informed of any benefits to myself or to 
others that may reasonably be expected as a result of this research.  
 
Compensation.  I understand that no tangible compensation will be given.  I understand 
that a copy of the research results will be available at the conclusion of the experiment via 
thesis documentation. 
 
Confidentiality & Privacy Act.  I understand that all records of this survey will be kept 
confidential and that my privacy will be safeguarded.  No information will be publicly 
accessible which could identify me as a participant.  I will not be identified in research 
forms/data bases. I understand that records of my participation will be maintained by NPS 
for three years, after which they will be destroyed.   
 
Voluntary Nature of the Survey.  I understand that my participation is strictly voluntary, 
and if I agree to participate, I am free to withdraw at any time without prejudice.   
 
Points of Contact.  I understand that if I have any questions or comments regarding this 
project upon the completion of my participation, I should contact the Principal 
Investigator, LtCol Karl D. Pfeiffer, USAF, Asst. Professor, 831-656-3635, 
kdpfeiff@nps.edu. Any other questions or concerns may be addressed to the IRB Chair, 
LT Brent Olde, 656-3807, baolde@nps.edu. 
 
Statement of Consent. I have been provided with a full explanation of the purpose, 
procedures, and duration of my participation in this survey. I understand how my 
identification will be safeguarded and have had all my questions answered.  I have been 
provided a copy of this form for my records and I agree to participate in this survey. I 
understand that by agreeing to participate in this research, I do not waive any of my legal 
rights.  By clicking the button below, I agree to participate in the survey. 
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INSTITUTION REVIEW BOARD (IRB) APPLICATION 
 
Application for Human Subjects Review  NPS IRB Number:   




LtCol Karl D. Pfeiffer, USAF, Asst. Professor, 831-656-3635 
Capt Douglas A. Cook, Student, 831-241-0032 
LT Bobby Patto, Student 
LT Pat Lancaster, Student 
Title of Experiment:   
 
Approval Requested        [X] New       [  ] Renewal      [  ] Amendment 
 
Requested Level of Risk    [  ] Exempt    [X] Minimal    [  ] More than Minimal 
Justification: 
Work to be done in (Site/Bldg/Rm) 
Survey via e-mail 
Estimated number of days to complete:  
1 
Maximum number of subjects: 
400 
Estimated length of each subjects participation: 
5-10 minutes 
Special Populations that will be Used as Participants: 
 
[  ] Subordinates   [  ] Minors   [  ] NPS Students   [  ] Special Needs (e.g. Pregnant women) 
 
Specify safeguards to avoid undue influence and protect subject’s rights: 
This survey will be sent to most faculty members.  It is completely voluntary and will ask for no personal 
information. 
Scientific Merit Review  (Check all that apply) 
 
[  ] This research is part of a funded project (Job Order Number:                         ) 
 
[X] This research is a student thesis (Attach a copy of the approved thesis proposal) 
 
[  ] Other (Attach a complete research proposal - Dept. Chair must sign Application Cover Letter) 
 
Outside Cooperating Investigators and Agencies: N/A 
[  ] A copy of the cooperating institution’s HSR decision is attached. 
Description of Research: (attach an additional sheet if needed).  This survey will be a 5-10 minute survey to 
the faculty in order to get an idea about how helpful it would be to have a CENTRIXS install here at NPS.  
It is completely voluntary, and will not ask for any personal information.   
 
 
I have read and understand NPS policy on the Protection of Human Subjects. If there are any changes in 
any of the above information or any changes to the attached materials, I will suspend the experiment until I 
obtain new IRB approval. 
 















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 129
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Bayer, Virginia.  SPAWAR PMW-160 PRNOC CENTRIXS Engineer.  Phone 
conversation April 2007. 
Boardman, J., & Shuey, D.  “Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange 
System (CENTRIXS); Supporting Coalition Warfare World-Wide.”  
USCENTCOM.  2004. 
Brewin, Bob.  Federal Computer Weekly, “DISA in, Navy out on CENTRIXS,” Article 
97622, 12 February 2007. 
Ching, Kenneth.  SPAWAR PMW-160 PRNOC CENTRIXS Engineer.  Phone 
conversation April 2007. 
CJCSINST 6285.01, 1 August 2006. 
CJCS J6 Joint Communication Systems Campaign Plan, Trident Warrior 2006, July 
2006. 
CJSINST 3170.01F, February 2007. 
Clements, P., Kazman R. & Klein, M. “Evaluating Software Architecture: Methods and 
Case Studies.” Addison Wesley, 2002. 
Cochrane, C.D., Defense Acquisition University Press, “Introduction to Defense 
Acquisition Management” Sixth Edition, 2003. 
Cochrane, C. D., Defense Acquisition University Press, “Program Managers Tool Kit,” 
14th Edition, 2005. 
Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) Fiscal Year 2008/2009 Budget Estimates, 
February 2007. 
Department of the Navy PEO C4I, Canes Roadmap, PMW-160, November 2006. 
Department of the Navy PEO C4I, Information Assurance and Enterprise Services, 2006. 
DoD Directive 5137.1, “Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, 
Communications, and Intelligence (ASD (C3I)).” 1992. 
DoD Information Assurance, Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP), 6 July 
2006. 
DoD Instruction 8110.1. “Multinational Information Sharing Networks Implementation.” 
February 2004. 
 130
DoD PEO C4I, Networks, Information Assurance and Enterprise Services (PMW160), 7 
November 2006. 
Fetter, Delores, Naval Acquisition Enterprise Panel, “Building the Naval Acquisition 
Enterprise,” Slide 36, 2006. 
Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (IDATL), Life Cycle 
Management Framework, DAU Press, 2005. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), “Joint Communication Systems Campaign Plan, Trident 
Warrior 2006,” July 2006. 
Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC) home page, 
http://jitc.fhu.disa.mil/washops/jtca/centrixs.html, Last Accessed June 2007. 
McGufrie, Michael., SPAWAR Allied Coalition Framework Brief, 2003. 
Military Communications Electronics Board (MCEB) Pub 1, 1 March 2002. 
MIP 4952/008, Navy Preventive Maintenance System, 2007. 
NDP-1.  “National Disclosure Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified 
Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations.” 
2002. 
PMW-160 Financial Management and Cost Estimating Support, Performance Work 
Statement (PWS), 20 June 2006. 
Preventive Maintenance System, Maintenance Index Page (MIP) 4952/008. 
SECNAVINST 5000.2C, Table E2T1 Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC), 
“CENTRIXS” Web site home page. 
Secret and Below Interoperability (SABI) Process Panel, NIST Conference Abstract, 
1998. 
Shannon, Joseph.  SPAWAR PMW-160 Engineer.  Phone conversation May 2007. 
Soriano, PMW 160.1, AFCEA Symposium Brief, 23 May 2007. 
Soriano, PMW 160.1, Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association 
(AFCEA) C4I Symposium Brief, 2007. 
SPAWAR Master Series web site, 
www.teammantech.com/masterseries/main/vforums/centrixs/vforum.swf, Last 
Accessed June 2007. 
 131
United States Central Command (USCENTCOM).  CENTRIXS CONOPS for 
Multinational Operations.  December 2004. 
United States Central Command (USCENTCOM).  Theater Security Cooperation 
Strategy.  March 2003. 
United States Navy website, http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=30603, 
Last Accessed August 2007. 
 132
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 133
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Fort Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
3. Marine Corps Representative 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
4. Director, Training and Education, MCCDC, Code C46 
 Quantico, Virginia 
  
5. Director, Marine Corps Research Center, MCCDC, Code C40RC 
 Quantico, Virginia 
  
6. Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (Attn: Operations Officer) 
 Camp Pendleton, California 
